Hirman E. Jackson v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), 79A04-1612-CR-2936

On Feb. 12, 2016 Hirman Jackson went to a vehicle in Lafayette and fired multiple shots into it; two passengers were seriously injured and others present were unharmed. Jackson admitted firing but claimed self-defense.
The State charged Jackson with multiple felonies, including five counts of attempted murder (Counts I–V) and various battery and weapons offenses; a jury convicted on Counts I–XIII and a bench trial convicted on Counts XIV and XVI; sentence totaled 92 years.
At trial the court instructed the jury on attempted murder (requiring specific intent to kill) and separately gave a transferred-intent instruction; defense did not object to the instructions at trial.
The trial court refused the State’s proposed instruction that intent to kill may be inferred from use of a deadly weapon, but allowed the State to argue that point in closing; the defense did not object to the closing argument.
On appeal Jackson argued (1) the transferred-intent instruction created fundamental error by blurring specific vs. general intent, and (2) the State’s closing argument improperly presented the rejected instruction’s substance.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Jackson)	Held
Whether giving a transferred-intent instruction constituted fundamental error	Transferred intent is a recognized doctrine applicable to attempted murder; trial also correctly instructed that attempted murder requires specific intent to kill, so instructions read as a whole were correct	Transferred-intent instruction blurred the distinction between specific and general intent and confused the jury, amounting to fundamental error	No. Court found attempted murder instruction correctly required specific intent and the transferred-intent instruction did not alter mens rea; no fundamental error
Whether the State’s closing argument (arguing that intent may be inferred from use of a deadly weapon) was improper because the court rejected the corresponding instruction	The court permitted the State to argue the point; discussing evidentiary bases for intent in argument is proper even if a corresponding instruction was refused	Arguing the substance of a refused instruction improperly emphasized a point the jury should not hear	Waived (no contemporaneous objection) and, in any event, not erroneous; trial court did not abuse discretion in allowing the argument

Shoun v. State, 67 N.E.3d 635 (Ind. 2017) (defining narrow, rare fundamental-error exception)
McCowan v. State, 27 N.E.3d 760 (Ind. 2015) (standards for evaluating jury instructions as a whole)
Spradlin v. State, 569 N.E.2d 948 (Ind. 1991) (attempted murder requires specific intent to kill)
Blanche v. State, 690 N.E.2d 709 (Ind. 1998) (transferred intent can apply to attempted murder)
Beasley v. State, 643 N.E.2d 346 (Ind. 1994) (incorrect mens rea in elements instruction may constitute incurable fundamental error)
Dill v. State, 741 N.E.2d 1230 (Ind. 2001) (improper to unnecessarily emphasize one evidentiary fact or phase in instructions/argument)
Weis v. State, 825 N.E.2d 896 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (argument on a legal point can be proper even if no instruction on that point was given)