Hinkson v. United States, 21-40174

In 1999 Owen Garth Hinkson (Jamaican citizen) pleaded guilty to illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a); the plea negotiated dismissal of related drug charges.
The district court (and plea paperwork) treated Hinkson as subject to the § 1326(b)(2) 20‑year maximum based on a 1987 Massachusetts conviction for assault and battery on a police officer.
The plea included a broad appellate/collateral‑attack waiver; Hinkson was sentenced to 110 months and later deported.
Hinkson sought coram nobis relief attacking the 1999 conviction, claiming (a) the 1987 conviction had been vacated and (b) Sessions v. Dimaya later foreclosed using that crime as an aggravated felony—thus the § 1326(b)(2) enhancement was invalid.
The district court denied coram nobis; on appeal the Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding the appellate waiver valid and that Hinkson’s ineffective‑assistance and Rule 11 arguments failed because neither counsel nor the court could be required to predict later legal developments.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Hinkson)	Defendant's Argument (U.S.)	Held
Whether the plea’s appellate/collateral‑attack waiver bars coram nobis	Waiver should not bar relief because underlying conviction/sentence was invalid	The waiver was informed and voluntary and bars collateral attacks including coram nobis	Waiver is valid and bars the coram nobis petition
Whether ineffective assistance of counsel invalidates the waiver/plea	Counsel failed to advise that the 1987 conviction would not support a §1326(b)(2) enhancement	Counsel cannot be required to foresee a 2005 vacatur or the 2018 Supreme Court decision; no deficient performance	No ineffective assistance; claim fails
Whether the court violated Rule 11 by advising a 20‑year maximum	Court misinformed Hinkson about the statutory maximum if the 1987 conviction did not qualify	Rule 11 does not require predicting future case law; defendant was informed of possible sentence	No Rule 11 error
Whether vacatur of the 1987 conviction or Dimaya entitles Hinkson to relief	Vacatur and Dimaya show the 1987 offense is not an aggravated felony, so enhancement was invalid	Even if true, collateral relief is barred by the valid waiver; other procedural bars apply	Court did not reach merits; waiver bars relief; petition denied

Jimenez v. Trominski, 91 F.3d 767 (5th Cir. 1996) (coram nobis is an extraordinary remedy for complete miscarriages of justice)
United States v. George, 676 F.3d 249 (1st Cir. 2012) (coram nobis analogous to habeas; appellate waivers can bar coram nobis)
United States v. Barnes, 953 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2020) (post‑plea legal developments do not vitiate informed waivers)
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) (a voluntary guilty plea stands despite later decisions showing plea rested on faulty premise)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong ineffective assistance standard: deficient performance and prejudice)
Almendarez‑Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) (sentence‑enhancement provisions need not be alleged in the indictment)
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (vagueness doctrine limited certain crime‑of‑violence/aggravated‑felony definitions)
United States v. Wilkes, 20 F.3d 651 (5th Cir. 1994) (informed waivers can bar § 2255 and similar collateral relief)
United States v. Portillo, 18 F.3d 290 (5th Cir. 1994) (evidence that defendant read and understood plea and waiver reinforces waiver validity)