Himnel USA v. City of Rancho Cucamonga CA4/2
E076801
Cal. Ct. App.Feb 2, 2023Background
- St. Mary’s Montessori (St. Mary’s) operates a daycare in Rancho Cucamonga and sought permits to expand into a larger facility that would include a private religious elementary school; Property owned by Global Property Holdings (GPH).
- Planning Director Candyce Burnett and successor engineer Felecia Marshall allegedly delayed approval, solicited opposition (phone call to local public school), referred the project to police, ordered photography and a walkthrough, sent a public letter, and sent the matter to the Planning Commission.
- The City imposed a large Transportation Development Fee (TDF) initially near $900,000 (later reduced to about $445,000), required payment before permitting, and appellants paid by loan at high interest; City allegedly promised a refund but never paid.
- Appellants sued (among others) the City under Monell/§1983 for discriminatory treatment in violation of equal protection and for intentional and negligent interference with prospective economic advantage.
- The trial court granted the City’s anti‑SLAPP motion and struck both the Monell and interference claims; appellants appealed. The Court of Appeal affirmed in part and reversed in part: Monell claim not subject to anti‑SLAPP; interference claim partly subject to anti‑SLAPP (call and letter were protected) and partly not (police/Planning referrals and investigation), and plaintiffs failed the minimal‑merit showing as to the protected communications.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Monell (§1983) claim arises from protected petition/speech | Monell claim is based on the City’s discriminatory policy/selective enforcement (TDF/resolution), not on employees’ speech; Burnett’s communications are only evidentiary | The claim rests on employees’ communications and referrals (calls, letter, investigations), which are protected under the anti‑SLAPP statute | Monell claim does NOT arise from protected activity for anti‑SLAPP purposes; anti‑SLAPP motion should have been denied as to Monell because the claim targets a municipal policy/custom, not merely speech |
| Whether interference claim arises from protected activity | Interference rests on Burnett’s adverse decisions (calling Windrows, police referral, photography/investigation, letter, Planning Commission referral) and thus are non‑protected official acts | Many of Burnett’s acts (calls, letter) are protected speech and thus subject to anti‑SLAPP | Mixed: calling Windrows and sending the letter are protected (anti‑SLAPP applies to those allegations); referring to police, directing investigation/photographs, and referral to Planning Commission are governmental decisions (not protected) so anti‑SLAPP does not apply to those allegations |
| Whether the interference claim based on protected communications has minimal merit | Plaintiffs say defendants intentionally disrupted economic relationships with prospective students and contractor and thus meet minimal‑merit standard | City argues plaintiffs cannot show knowledge by defendants of the specific prospective relationships and that evidence was insufficient | Plaintiffs failed to show minimal merit as to the interference claim grounded on Burnett’s protected communications because they could not show defendants knew of the relevant prospective economic relationships; those protected‑speech allegations did not survive second prong |
| Overall disposition of anti‑SLAPP order | — | — | Trial court’s anti‑SLAPP order reversed in part and affirmed in part: Monell claim reinstated (anti‑SLAPP denied); interference claim survives insofar as it alleges non‑communicative adverse official acts; interference allegations based on the call and letter were subject to anti‑SLAPP and failed the minimal‑merit showing |
Key Cases Cited
- Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (U.S. 1978) (municipal liability under §1983 requires a policy, practice, or custom that is the moving force behind a constitutional violation)
- Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University, 2 Cal.5th 1057 (Cal. 2017) (distinguishes adverse governmental decisions from protected speech that may merely be evidence of motive)
- Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System, 11 Cal.5th 995 (Cal. 2021) (official disciplinary acts can be nonprotected decisions even when associated statements are protected)
- Laker v. Board of Trustees of California State University, 32 Cal.App.5th 745 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019) (speech used in decisionmaking may be evidence but is not per se the basis of a claim; distinguishes investigative/administrative acts from protected speech)
- Arista v. County of Riverside, 29 Cal.App.5th 1051 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018) (Monell pleading requires identification of a policy/practice and a link to the constitutional violation)
- Roy Allan Slurry Seal, Inc. v. American Asphalt South, Inc., 2 Cal.5th 505 (Cal. 2017) (elements of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage)
- Baral v. Schnitt, 1 Cal.5th 376 (Cal. 2016) (protected activity that only provides context and not the basis for liability cannot be struck under anti‑SLAPP)