Hilton v. State, 288 Ga. 201

Freddie Hilton was convicted of malice murder, two felony murder counts, aggravated assault, and armed robbery for the November 3, 1971 murder of Atlanta Police Officer James Green.
Evidence showed Green was shot by two different .38 caliber revolvers; his badge and gun were stolen at the scene.
A Black Liberation Army cell in Atlanta in 1971 included Hilton, Myers, Thomas, and others; witnesses placed Hilton with Myers around the time of the shooting.
Co-indictees provided statements implicating Hilton, some of which were later excluded or deemed inconsistent with trial evidence.
Hilton, later known as Kamau Sadiki, was indicted in 2002 and tried in 2003 after long post-crime delays; convictions were sustained on appeal.
The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the judgment, addressing evidentiary exclusions, conspiracy instructions, and pre-indictment delay due process

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of the evidence	Hilton argues the evidence does not prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.	State contends the jury could reasonably credit witnesses linking Hilton to the murder.	Evidence sufficient for guilt beyond reasonable doubt
Exclusion of Ignae Thomas testimony	Hilton asserts Thomas's statements were admissible under hearsay exceptions for co-conspirator admissions.	State contends exclusion was proper given lack of reliability and corroboration.	No abuse of discretion in excluding testimony
Admission of NY detective testimony about Hilton's information	Hilton claims such testimony is inflammatory and evidentiary to character rather than motive.	State asserts relevance to motive/knowledge about BLA and to link Hilton to Thomas's discussions.	Admissible to show motive/knowledge; relevant к to case
Conspiracy charge instructions	Hilton contends the conspiracy instruction improperly allowed conviction for any conspirator’s act.	State maintains the instruction, read with whole charge, properly required actual participation or aiding the conspiracy.	Conspiracy charge properly instructed; not error
Pre-indictment delay and due process	Hilton argues long delay prejudiced defense and was deliberate to gain advantage.	State asserts no prejudice and no deliberate tactical delay; prosecutorial discretion allowed by Lovasco/Stoner line.	Delay did not violate due process; no prejudice shown

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. S. Ct. 1979) (sufficiency review for evidence; jury credibility resolves conflicts)
Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32 (Ga. 2009) (credibility and conflicts for jury determination)
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (U.S. S. Ct. 1973) (exceptional hearsay admissibility for trustworthy confessions)
Drane v. State, 271 Ga. 849 (Ga. 1999) (abuse of discretion standard for excluding hearsay evidence)
Coleman v. State, 286 Ga. 291 (Ga. 2009) (hearsay exclusions reviewed for abuse of discretion)
Mize v. State, 269 Ga. 646 (Ga. 1998) (relevance of motive/knowledge evidence to intent)
Clark v. State, 271 Ga. 6 (Ga. 1999) (admissibility of gang-related knowledge to show motive)
Gonzalez-Sanchez, 825 F.2d 572 (1st Cir. 1987) (evidence of knowledge of others' crimes admissible to show intent)
Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (U.S. S. Ct. 1977) (no duty to indict as soon as probable cause exists)
Stoner v. Graddick, 751 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1985) (delay not inherently deliberate; pre-indictment delay due process standard)
Wooten v. State, 262 Ga. 876 (Ga. 1993) (delay prejudice analysis in pre-indictment delay cases)