Hilton Hotels Corp. v. Anderson
153 So. 3d 412
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2014Background
- In 2008 Troy Anderson was assaulted in an Embassy Suites parking lot; hotel owner W2007, franchisor Hilton, manager Interstate, and security contractor SecurAmerica were sued for negligent security.
- Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint asserting negligence claims by Troy and his wife Paula; no vicarious-liability allegations were pleaded.
- Anderson served separate written demands for judgment under Fla. Stat. § 768.79 to Hilton, W2007, Interstate (identical language, differing amounts), and later to SecurAmerica.
- At trial Anderson agreed the jury could treat Hilton, W2007, and Interstate collectively as “Embassy Suites,” and the jury so found (Embassy Suites 72% at fault; SecurAmerica 28%; Anderson 0%).
- Total judgment exceeded $1.7 million; trial court entered partial final judgments against the “Embassy Suites” group and SecurAmerica and reserved attorney’s fees issues.
- Trial court denied Anderson’s request for attorney’s fees under § 768.79, finding his demands ambiguous and, alternatively, unenforceable given the joint-treatment of the three entities; the court of appeal affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Anderson’s § 768.79 demands were sufficiently definite to trigger fee-shifting | Demands were valid § 768.79 proposals directed to each defendant; Anderson recovered >25% more than demands so fees are warranted | Demands were ambiguous (purporting to settle “any and all claims”), possibly covering both Troy and Paula, thus unenforceable | Demands were ambiguous and unenforceable; fee award denied |
| Whether separate demands against three entities are enforceable where plaintiff requested the jury treat them as one and the judgment is less than the sum of the demands | Fees should be awarded against each entity per the separate demands | Because plaintiff asked the jury to treat the three as one and recovery against them was less than the aggregate demands, imposing fees would contravene § 768.79’s purpose and be inappropriate | Separate demands against the three entities were not enforceable in these circumstances; alternative basis to deny fees |
Key Cases Cited
- Sarkis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 863 So.2d 210 (Fla. 2003) (§ 768.79 is penal and must be strictly construed)
- Campbell v. Goldman, 959 So.2d 223 (Fla. 2007) (§ 768.79 is in derogation of the common-law rule on fees; strict construction required)
- Stasio v. McManaway, 936 So.2d 676 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (ambiguous proposals for settlement are unenforceable)
- Dryden v. Pedemonti, 910 So.2d 854 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (burden to clarify a proposal cannot be placed on the offeree)
- Hibbard ex rel. Carr v. McGraw, 918 So.2d 967 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005) (offer ambiguous as to which plaintiffs/claims were covered; § 768.79 award reversed)
- Winter Park Imports, Inc. v. J.M. Family Enterprises, 66 So.3d 336 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (distinguishing § 768.79 substantive law from Rule 1.442 procedure)