Hillesheim v. Morris-Walkers, Ltd.
0:18-cv-00851
| D. Minnesota | Jul 19, 2019Background
- Plaintiff Zach Hillesheim, a wheelchair user, visited Emma Krumbee’s restaurant (owned by Morris-Walker Ltd. and Orchard Park, LLC) and sued under the ADA and Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) alleging parking- and interior-accessibility violations.
- Hillesheim’s counsel also represented Melanie Davis, who previously sued the same defendants for ADA violations at the same restaurant; that case (Davis) resulted in remediation and a dismissal as moot, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed (modifying ADA dismissal to without prejudice).
- Hillesheim filed suit about one month after Davis’s dismissal, asserting some overlapping parking claims (e.g., number of accessible spaces) and additional parking and interior claims (e.g., slope, curb ramp landing, maneuvering clearance, accessible dining surfaces, restroom fixtures).
- Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), arguing collateral estoppel/res judicata barred at least some ADA claims and that MHRA claims failed for lack of statutorily required pre-suit notice.
- The court stayed proceedings pending the Davis appeal, then lifted the stay and resolved the Rule 12(c) motion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hillesheim is precluded from relitigating the number of accessible parking spaces (ADA) | Hillesheim alleged he encountered parking defects different from Davis and resulting from defendants’ remediation | Davis adjudicated the parking-space-count issue; collateral estoppel bars relitigation | Granted: claim as to number of accessible spaces precluded and dismissed with prejudice |
| Whether remaining ADA claims (other parking defects and interior barriers) are precluded | These claims arise from distinct barriers encountered after Davis and were not litigated in Davis | All ADA claims are barred by prior judgment | Denied: remaining ADA claims not precluded at pleading stage (allowed to proceed) |
| Whether MHRA claims must be dismissed for failure to provide statutorily required pre-suit notice | Hillesheim contends he is exempt because he challenges the certified report from Davis | Defendants say they received no pre-suit notice identifying the specific barriers alleged by Hillesheim | Granted: MHRA claims dismissed without prejudice for failure to give required pre-suit notice |
| Whether defendants should be sanctioned for invoking collateral estoppel/res judicata | Not argued as a substantive defense by plaintiff beyond a letter request | Defendants fairly relied on prior judgment (Davis) in making their preclusion arguments | Denied: request for sanctions was baseless and denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Davis v. Morris-Walker, Ltd., 922 F.3d 868 (8th Cir. 2019) (affirming district court judgment in related ADA litigation and addressing scope of prior adjudication)
- In re Miera, 926 F.2d 741 (8th Cir. 1991) (elements of collateral estoppel)
- Ashley County, Ark. v. Pfizer, Inc., 552 F.3d 659 (8th Cir. 2009) (Rule 12(c) standard analogous to Rule 12(b)(6))
- Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585 (8th Cir. 2009) (pleading standard for facial plausibility under Rule 12)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (complaint must raise right to relief above speculative level)