Hill v. Walker, 948 N.E.2d 601

Hill, an inmate at Tamms Correctional Center, sued the Director of Corrections and the Illinois Prisoner Review Board seeking declaratory and mandamus relief related to parole proceedings.
Hill's murders occurred in 1974–1975; he was sentenced to death, then on remand pled guilty to two counts of murder and received prison terms of 30–90 years.
The Board conducted multiple parole hearings from 1983 through 2006, denying parole primarily due to offense seriousness and, later, disciplinary infractions in 2000.
The legislature amended parole law in 1988 to allow hearings to be scheduled up to three years apart if parole is unlikely; Hill challenged these amendments as ex post facto and as due process violations.
The circuit court dismissed Hill's second amended complaint under 735 ILCS 5/2-615; the appellate court affirmed; this court granted leave to appeal.
The court ultimately held that parole is not a constitutionally protected liberty interest and affirmed the appellate court’s dismissal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Due process in parole decisions	Hill asserts procedural unfairness in considering the death sentence and 2000 infractions.	Board's discretion and statutory framework provide no protected liberty interest; due process requires no more than existing procedures.	No due process violation; no liberty interest in parole.
Ex post facto — changed discretionary standard	Board's stricter post-mortem discretion unlawfully increased punishment retroactively.	Garner/Greiner guidance; discretion can evolve without violating ex post facto.	No ex post facto violation; discretion changes are permissible.
Ex post facto — reduced frequency of parole hearings	Amendments reducing hearing frequency retroactively increased punishment.	Fletcher Morales framework; frequency reductions do not amount to punishment increase.	Not ex post facto; amendments do not create a sufficient risk of increased punishment.

Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1979) (parole not a fundamental right; due process depends on a protectable liberty interest)
Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369 (U.S. 1987) (parole release as a remedy when prerequisites exist; liberty interest framework)
Hanrahan v. Williams, 174 Ill.2d 268 (1996) (parole discretion; lack of objective release standards; duty to deny under statutory criteria)
Morales v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499 (U.S. 1995) (ex post facto analysis for parole–related legislation; risk of punishment increase)
Ganci v. Washington, 318 Ill.App.3d 1174 (Ill. App. 2001) ( Garnder/Morales framework; caution against retroactive applications)
Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244 (U.S. 2000) (discretionary parole; change in rule may be allowed if not increasing punishment; fact-intensive inquiry not always required)
Grennier v. Frank, 453 F.3d 442 (7th Cir. 2006) (discretion in parole systems; constitutional interest lies in rules, not officials' attitudes)
Fletcher v. Williams, 179 Ill.2d 225 (Ill. 1997) (ex post facto challenge to frequency Schedule; approved under Morales framework)
Heidelberg v. Illinois Prisoner Review Board, 163 F.3d 1025 (7th Cir. 1998) (parole as privilege; procedural protections under due process)
People v. Hawkins, 54 Ill.2d 247 (1973) (parole as grace; not a right)