420 P.3d 732
Wyo.2018Background
- Cynthia Hill, former Wyoming Superintendent of Public Instruction, sued Timothy Stubson for defamation per se and injunctive relief based on statements he made in 2016 criticizing her performance related to SF104.
- SF104 was legislation that limited the superintendent’s authority; Hill had challenged its constitutionality and prevailed in Powers v. State.
- Stubson, a legislator who voted for SF104 and was running for Congress, made statements on Facebook and at a public debate alleging Hill was "not following the law," "out of control," and had committed "illegal acts."
- Hill amended her complaint alleging actual malice and requested disqualification of the assigned judge for prior adverse rulings; the motion to disqualify was denied.
- The district court dismissed Hill’s complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), finding First Amendment protections required a showing of actual malice and that Hill failed to plead it; on appeal the Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed dismissal but on different grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether complaint pleaded actual malice | Hill alleged facts (investigation clearing her, ¶64 asserting Stubson knew statements were false) sufficient to infer Stubson knowingly or recklessly made false statements | Stubson argued statements were protected political speech and complaint failed to plead facts showing subjective knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard | Court: Complaint sufficiently alleged actual malice (must accept allegations as true at motion-to-dismiss stage) |
| Whether Hill stated defamation per se | Hill claimed statements imputed criminal acts and were incompatible with office, thus actionable per se | Stubson argued statements were not specific accusations of criminal conduct nor affected Hill’s office status at time of statements | Court: Complaint failed to state defamation per se — Hill was not holding the office in 2016 and “illegal” statements were not specific allegations of a crime punishable by imprisonment or involving moral turpitude |
| Whether judge should have been disqualified under W.R.C.P. 40.1(b)(2) | Hill alleged Judge Campbell’s prior adverse rulings and public criticism created personal bias against her | Stubson and court argued adverse prior rulings and public disagreement do not alone show personal bias or prejudgment | Court: Denial of disqualification affirmed — affidavit presented rulings/speculation but no convincing evidence of personal bias; no abuse of discretion |
| Whether injunctive relief claim was viable | Hill sought a permanent injunction barring Stubson from defamatory conduct | Stubson contended First Amendment and lack of irreparable harm/adequate pleading defeat injunctive relief | Court: Injunctive claim dismissed as insufficiently pled and likely a prohibited prior restraint on speech |
Key Cases Cited
- New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (establishes actual malice standard for public officials)
- Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (explains public official inquiry and public-interest basis for applying New York Times rule)
- Powers v. State, 318 P.3d 300 (Wyo. 2014) (Hill’s prior challenge to SF104 resulted in legislation being declared unconstitutional)
- Martin v. Comm. for Honesty and Justice at Star Valley Ranch, 101 P.3d 123 (Wyo. 2004) (summarizes actual malice definition in Wyoming law)
- Davis v. Big Horn Basin Newspapers, Inc., 884 P.2d 979 (Wyo. 1994) (discusses knowledge/reckless-disregard standard for actual malice)