Hill v. Lappin
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 26261
| 6th Cir. | 2010Background
- Hill, a federal prisoner at McCreary in 2009, alleges staff retaliated against him for grievances by placing him in segregated housing and threatening a transfer to Lewisburg.
- Hill previously alleges Lewisburg staff assaulted him in 2005 and that they called him a rat in 2006, but those allegations are deemed implausible as he admitted prior suit was dismissed for lack of proof.
- Hill sues the BOP Director and four McCreary staff under a Bivens theory seeking damages and preliminary relief to prevent transfer.
- The district court dismissed the complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B), finding no inherent right to avoid transfer or segregation and finding the fear of harm speculative.
- The Sixth Circuit reverses, holding Hill's pro se allegations are sufficient to state a plausible First Amendment retaliation claim at this stage.
- The court adopts Iqbal/Twombly standards for § 1915A/e(2)(B)(ii) dismissals and treats Hill’s allegations liberally given pro se status.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Hill state a First Amendment retaliation claim against federal officials? | Hill's housing and transfer threats constitute retaliation for grievances. | No constitutional violation because no protected right to avoid segregation or transfer exists. | Yes; complaint states a plausible retaliation claim. |
| Should the complaint survive 1915A/1915(e)(2)(B) review under Iqbal/Twombly? | Allegations are plausible and sufficient despite pro se pleading. | Dismissal appropriate if not plausibly stated under new pleading standard. | Iqbal/Twombly standards apply; allegations are plausible. |
| Are segregated housing and threat of transfer adverse actions supporting retaliation claim? | Housing segregation and transfer threat deter protected conduct. | These actions do not fall within protected rights or are speculative. | Yes; both actions are plausibly adverse actions. |
| Is there sufficient motive evidence to show retaliatory intent? | Temporal proximity, disparate treatment, and direct statements show motive. | Motivation not shown without substantial direct evidence at this stage. | Yes; circumstantial and some direct evidence support motive. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (Supreme Court 1971) (establishes Bivens remedy for federal constitutional violations)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (Supreme Court 2009) (plausibility standard for pleading survive Rule 12(b)(6))
- Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court 2007) (akin plausibility standard for pleadings)
- Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (Supreme Court 1989) (frivolousness standard in § 1915 proceedings)
- Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378 (6th Cir.1999) (elements of retaliation claim and deterrent standard)
- Herron v. Harrison, 203 F.3d 410 (6th Cir.2000) (pro se pleading liberal construction; protected conduct via grievances)
- Siggers-El v. Barlow, 412 F.3d 693 (6th Cir.2005) (retaliation motive can be inferred from conduct and context)
- Holzemer v. City of Memphis, 621 F.3d 512 (6th Cir.2010) (temporal proximity and motive considerations in retaliation)