Hill ex rel. Hill v. Damm, 804 N.W.2d 95

Thirteen-year-old Donnisha Hill was murdered after alighting at a bus stop near a known sex offender; her parents sued First Student for negligence.
Donnisha’s bus route was changed at her mother’s request to allow sight of her boarding/alighting; the change was approved by the school district’s executive director.
A dispatcher and a bus driver anticipated safety concerns and discussed altering the route due to alleged abuse; the driver warned Donnisha’s mother that the “man” would kill her.
Donnisha was picked up near the offender’s dealership, was abducted by a hired killer, and her death occurred after contact with the offender; Damm and Burt were convicted of the murder.
The district court granted First Student’s directed verdict, ruling the harm was outside the risk created by First Student’s conduct; plaintiffs appealed seeking submission to a jury under Restatement (Third) of Torts.
The Iowa Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding the issue of scope of liability is fact-intensive and must be decided by a jury where reasonable minds could differ.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Donnisha’s murder was within the risks that made First Student’s conduct tortious	Hill argues the risk included general safety oversight and foreseeability of harm from the offender; the route change increased exposure to risk.	First Student contends the identifiable risk was sexual abuse by Damm, not kidnapping/murder by a third party.	No; jury question on scope of liability remains.
Whether the Restatement Third risk standard applies to determine scope of liability in this case	The risk standard should include foreseeability of broader harms arising from the bus company’s conduct.	The district court should limit liability to risks directly tied to the initial wrongdoing (sexual abuse).	Jury to decide under a broad, fact-intensive scope standard.
Whether proximate/factual causation supports First Student’s liability given Donnisha’s independent decisions	First Student’s bus-stop choice placed Donnisha in harm’s path; driver’s negligence could be a factual cause.	Even if negligent, Donnisha’s own decision to go to the dealership broke the chain of liability.	Not dispositive; factual causation to be determined by the jury.

Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829 (Iowa 2009) (adopted Restatement (Third) principles for liability for physical harm)
Brokaw v. Winfield-Mt. Union Cmty. Sch. Dist., 788 N.W.2d 386 (Iowa 2010) (recognizes risk-based scope considerations under Restatement Third)
R oyal Indem. Co. v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., 786 N.W.2d 839 (Iowa 2010) (directed verdict standard and deeming cases for jury review)
Reed v. Chrysler Corp., 494 N.W.2d 224 (Iowa 1992) (directed verdict standard guidance pre-Thompson)
Keding v. State, 553 N.W.2d 305 (Iowa 1996) (encourages submitting weak cases to jury)
Jahn v. Hyundai Motor Co., 773 N.W.2d 550 (Iowa 2009) (restatement principles and causation context)
Burton v. Des Moines Metropolitan Transit Auth., 530 N.W.2d 696 (Iowa 1995) (carrier vs. school district duties post-alighting distinction)
Johnson v. Svoboda, 260 N.W.2d 530 (Iowa 1977) (continuing duty of care for school transportation)