Hill, Ex Parte Anthony
PD-0915-15
| Tex. App. | Jul 22, 2015Background
- Anthony Hill pled guilty to aggravated robbery (shooting Ryan Lusk) and was sentenced to 45 years in June 2013.
- Five months later the victim died (Nov. 19, 2013); Hill was indicted for capital murder (Dec. 30, 2013) based on the same shooting during the robbery.
- Hill filed a pretrial writ of habeas corpus arguing the capital murder prosecution violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because aggravated robbery is a lesser-included offense of the alleged capital murder.
- The trial court granted habeas relief and barred the capital-murder prosecution; the State appealed to the Dallas Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals reversed, holding an exception to double jeopardy (rooted in Diaz) permits successive prosecution for a greater offense when facts necessary for the greater crime (the victim’s death) were not present at the time of the first prosecution.
- Hill sought discretionary review from the Court of Criminal Appeals, raising multiple grounds challenging the Court of Appeals’ reliance on Diaz and its narrowing of the Blockburger same-offense test.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Hill) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held (Court of Appeals) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether double jeopardy bars successive prosecution for capital murder after conviction for a lesser-included offense | Hill: Successive prosecution and multiple punishment are barred because aggravated robbery is a lesser-included/same offense as alleged capital murder | State: Diaz exception allows prosecution for greater offense when additional elements (death) did not exist at time of first trial | Court of Appeals: Reversed trial court; Diaz-based exception applies, so prosecution may proceed |
| Whether multiple punishments would violate double jeopardy if defendant later convicted of greater offense | Hill: Punishing both offenses is constitutionally prohibited absent clear legislative intent | State: If the greater offense could not be tried earlier, legislature’s intent does not prevent later prosecution; remedy is vacatur of the lesser conviction if necessary | Court of Appeals: Recognized potential multiple-punishment concern but upheld ability to prosecute; suggested vacating lesser conviction if both arise simultaneously |
| Applicability of Blockburger same-offense test to successive prosecutions where greater offense post-dates conviction | Hill: Blockburger controls; offenses are the same and bar later prosecution | State: Blockburger is a general proposition; Diaz exception survives for incomplete or undetected crimes | Court of Appeals: Applied Diaz exception and declined to treat Blockburger as dispositive here |
| Validity and scope of Diaz v. United States as an exception to double jeopardy | Hill: Diaz is outdated/distinguishable and should not create a carte blanche exception | State: Diaz remains good law for situations where elements (e.g., death) occur after initial prosecution | Court of Appeals: Held Diaz remains a viable exception and controls here |
Key Cases Cited
- Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) (same-offense test compares statutory elements to determine double jeopardy bar)
- Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912) (successive prosecution permitted when additional elements of greater offense did not exist at time of earlier trial)
- Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977) (reinforces same-offense principles and recognizes limited exceptions where greater elements arise later)
- Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977) (double jeopardy protects against successive prosecutions and repetitive trials beyond sentencing concerns)
- Ex parte Chaddock, 369 S.W.3d 880 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (discusses double jeopardy protections and harms of successive prosecutions)
- Graves v. State, 539 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (applies Diaz-based reasoning in Texas context)
- Littrell v. State, 271 S.W.3d 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (addresses legislative intent and multiple-punishment analysis)