Hill, Albert G.
PD-0020-15
| Tex. | Nov 2, 2015Background
- Albert G. Hill III was indicted in March 2011 on mortgage-fraud–related charges; charges against his wife were later dismissed. Hill filed a Motion to Dismiss in November 2012 alleging selective, vindictive, and biased prosecution tied to improper influence by a third party (Lisa Blue) on the District Attorney (Watkins).
- Hill attached extensive documentary and testimonial proffers to his motion (emails, phone/text logs, deposition excerpts, internal DA emails, and related pleadings) and obtained a trial-court ruling that the proffer entitled him to a hearing.
- The State acknowledged authenticity of Hill’s exhibits at the hearing (no authenticity objection), but contended the exhibits were admitted only "for record purposes" and denied stipulating to admissibility; Hill argues that the stipulation amounted to a judicial admission binding the State.
- Hill contends the DA improperly singled him out—no other office witnesses could identify similar prosecutions—and that the prosecution resulted from invidious, improper influence rather than legitimate law-enforcement motives.
- Central legal dispute: what showing ("some evidence," "colorable claim," or higher standard) a defendant must make via attached proffers to obtain a hearing and discovery on claims of selective, vindictive, or biased prosecution.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Hill) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held (trial court / argued position) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard for entitlement to a hearing on selective-prosecution claim | A defendant who attaches a proffer that the court deems a "colorable claim" or "some evidence" of selective/invidious prosecution is entitled to a hearing; the required showing is not proof by preponderance or beyond a reasonable doubt | The movant must meet a higher threshold and the State disputed that Hill’s attachments established admissible evidence warranting a hearing; contests stipulation to admissibility | Trial court exercised discretion to grant a hearing upon finding Hill’s proffer constituted "some evidence" / a colorable claim; Hill urges this Court to affirm that standard |
| Effect of State’s stipulation to authenticity of exhibits | The State’s concession on authenticity amounted to a judicial admission, relieving Hill of further proof and barring the State from disputing those facts | The State says it did not stipulate to admissibility and limited its concession to authenticity for record purposes | Hill asserts stipulation = judicial admission; trial court relied on proffers to justify hearing |
| Whether prosecution was selective/invidious (sufficiency of proffer) | Proffered emails, calls, deposition testimony, and internal DA statements provide "exceptionally clear" evidence that Watkins singled Hill out for invidious reasons (favor to Blue) and no similar prosecutions exist | State argues witnesses limited their testimony to caseload scope and that Hill’s evidence is insufficient and anecdotal | Trial court found Hill’s proffer sufficient to shift burden and warrant further inquiry; Hill argues Armstrong standard met |
| Relationship among selective, vindictive, and impartial-prosecutor claims | A prosecutor who prosecutes for an invidious or discriminatory purpose cannot be "impartial"; Hill’s selective/vindictive evidence also supports a due-process claim for lack of an impartial prosecutor | State contends Hill abandoned the impartial-prosecutor claim and treats selective/vindictive claims as distinct | Hill maintains he has not abandoned the impartial-prosecutor argument and that the claims are interrelated; trial court allowed hearing on misconduct claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) (due-process protection against vindictive prosecution)
- Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980) (distinguishing zeal from structural conflicts for impartiality analysis)
- Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton Et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987) (when prosecutor’s personal interest creates structural conflict)
- United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (defendant must make a threshold showing to obtain discovery/hearing on selective-prosecution claim)
- United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982) (presumption-of-vindictiveness framework and when due-process presumption arises)
- United States v. Brown, 298 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2002) (discussing vindictiveness standards)
- United States v. Cooks, 52 F.3d 101 (5th Cir. 1995) (movant must show a colorable claim to obtain discovery on selective-prosecution allegations)
- United States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1978) (Fifth Circuit articulation of prima facie showing for prosecutorial-misconduct discovery)
- Richardson v. State, 831 So. 2d 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (state-court application of colorable-basis standard for selective-prosecution discovery)
- Commonwealth v. Washington W., 928 N.E.2d 908 (Mass. 2010) (permitting limited discovery on minimal/colorable showing of selective prosecution)
- State v. Ballard, 752 A.2d 735 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (discovery on selective-enforcement claim available only upon a colorable showing)