Hill, Albert G.
PD-0020-15
| Tex. App. | Sep 9, 2015Background
- Albert G. Hill III was indicted for mortgage-related felonies (false statement to obtain property/credit; securing execution of a document by deception); the State prosecuted.
- Hill alleged the indictments were the product of improper influence by Lisa Blue on District Attorney Craig Watkins to interfere with a pending fee-dispute civil trial between Hill and Blue.
- Hill moved to dismiss/for an evidentiary hearing on selective and vindictive prosecution grounds; the trial court granted dismissal after in camera proceedings and findings (incorporating Hill’s proposed findings).
- The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed, holding Hill did not present "some evidence" tending to show the essential elements of selective/vindictive prosecution and therefore was not entitled to discovery or an evidentiary hearing.
- Lisa Blue, as amicus, argues Armstrong controls the standard (a defendant must present some evidence) and that Hill’s proffer is speculative (timing of calls, donations, messaging, fundraiser, unusual charges) and insufficient to require a hearing.
Issues
| Issue | Hill's Argument | Blue/State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Franks v. Delaware standard (liberal proffer allowing hearing) applies to selective/vindictive prosecution claims | Franks-like proffer should suffice to obtain a hearing—defense may state what witnesses would show | Franks does not apply; Armstrong requires "some evidence" tending to show essential elements before a hearing | Armstrong standard governs; Franks not appropriate |
| Whether Hill made a prima facie/some-evidence showing of selective or vindictive prosecution | Timing of donations/fundraiser, communications between Blue and Watkins, "unusual" charges, timing before fee-trial create an inference of improper motive | These facts are speculative and equally consistent with lawful explanations given longstanding friendship and political support; no evidence of communication content or quid pro quo | Hill failed to present the necessary "some evidence"; speculation insufficient |
| Whether invocation of privilege by Blue/Watkins justified dismissal of indictments without prior sufficient proffer | Hill: privilege invocation prevented development of evidence; dismissal was warranted | Blue: privilege invocation alone does not validate dismissal when movant lacked prima facie showing | Court of Appeals: dismissal was erroneous because Hill had not made the required showing; remand to reinstate indictments |
| Whether public-policy concerns justify lowering the evidentiary threshold to allow hearings in selective-prosecution claims | Hill: defendants cannot access evidence because it lies with the prosecutor; courts should allow hearing on colorable claims | Blue: policy favors protecting prosecutors from fishing expeditions; Armstrong strikes balance requiring some evidence first | Policy does not overcome Armstrong; courts require some evidence before permitting discovery/hearing |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (a defendant must produce "some evidence" tending to show essential elements of selective prosecution before discovery or an evidentiary hearing)
- Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (to compel an evidentiary hearing on a warrant affidavit, attack must be more than conclusory and supported by more than a desire to cross-examine)
- Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181 (1992) (generalized allegations of improper motive do not entitle a defendant to discovery or hearing)
- United States v. Jennings, 724 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1984) (conclusory allegations insufficient to support selective-prosecution hearing)
- United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 1998) (defendant must present facts sufficient to create reasonable doubt about constitutionality of prosecution to obtain a hearing)
- United States v. Sanchez, 517 F.3d 651 (2d Cir. 2008) (generalized allegations of improper motive do not disturb presumption of regularity)