Hileman v. Internet Wines & Spirits Co.
3:17-cv-00165
S.D. Ill.May 30, 2017Background
- Hileman, a former IWS employee, informed owner George Randall in April 2013 that she was transgender and planned to transition; she alleges subsequent discrimination and threats by Randall.
- Hileman filed EEOC charges in August and December 2013 and sued IWS and Randall in federal court in December 2014; that federal suit settled in March 2015 and Hileman resigned as part of the settlement.
- In November 2015 Hileman appeared in a news report about the transgender community; IWS demanded she get the report removed and later sued Hileman in Missouri state court for breach of the settlement’s nondisparagement clause and defamation.
- The state court dismissed the defamation claims, partially dismissed the breach claim, sanctioned IWS for discovery failures, and the state action remains pending; Hileman alleges IWS brought the suit knowing it was meritless and motivated by retaliation.
- Hileman filed new charges with the EEOC and Missouri Commission on Human Rights alleging retaliation; both agencies issued right-to-sue notices in January 2017, and Hileman filed this federal retaliation suit on February 16, 2017.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hileman plausibly pleaded Title VII retaliation | Hileman alleges protected activity (EEOC charges, prior federal suit) and that IWS filed a meritless state suit in retaliation | Defendants argue the complaint fails to plead a prima facie case of retaliation with sufficient specificity | Court: Complaint meets pleading standard; plausibly alleges protected activity and materially adverse action, so dismissal denied |
| Whether MHRA claim survives dismissal | Hileman contends MHRA protects against retaliation beyond employer-employee acts, covering this conduct | Defendants contend pleading is insufficient under MHRA | Court: MHRA is broad and the pleadings suffice at this stage; claim survives |
| Whether plaintiff must plead full prima facie case at pleading stage | Hileman argues she need only meet low pleading threshold, not prove prima facie elements now | Defendants argue she must establish prima facie elements to survive dismissal | Court: Plaintiff need not establish a prima facie case at pleading stage; only sufficient facts to state plausible claim |
| Whether state-court lawsuit can be a materially adverse action | Hileman alleges the baseless state suit was retaliatory and materially adverse | Defendants implicitly argue it is not actionable or sufficiently pled | Court: Former-employee protection and Burlington precedent allow non-employment retaliatory harms; state suit qualifies at pleading stage |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading must state a plausible claim)
- Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plausibility pleading standard)
- Virnich v. Vorwald, 664 F.3d 206 (accept factual allegations and draw inferences for plaintiff on motion to dismiss)
- Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (Title VII retaliation covers actions beyond workplace-related harms)
- Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (former employees are protected by Title VII retaliation provision)
- Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014 (pleading standard in Title VII retaliation cases is undemanding)
- Tate v. SCR Med. Transp., 809 F.3d 343 (distinguishing pleading vs. summary judgment standards in retaliation cases)
- Keeney v. Hereford Concrete Prod., Inc., 911 S.W.2d 622 (MHRA’s reach extends beyond employer-employee relationship)