Hilda Brucker v. City of Doraville, 38 F.4th 876

Doraville relied on municipal fines and fees for roughly 11–25% of its general fund (2015–2019); city documents and actions showed the municipal court was an important revenue source.
The municipal court has a single long‑tenured judge who is paid a fixed salary, has no executive authority over city finances, reports to no city official, and whose decisions are appealable to state superior court.
The prosecutor is a contractor paid a fixed amount per court session (not per case), has no budget authority, and does not control court scheduling; the police department receives a large portion of the budget but officers are salaried and the department denies enforcement quotas.
Code enforcement is performed by a private contractor paid hourly; its citations produce less than 10% of the City’s fines revenue and the program operates at a net cost.
Four plaintiffs convicted in Doraville municipal court sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging due‑process violations from an unconstitutional risk of bias tied to the City’s reliance on fines and fees; the district court granted summary judgment for the City and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Municipal‑court judge bias	City’s heavy reliance on fines creates a risk the judge will favor convictions to protect city revenue and his job	Judge is paid fixed salary, lacks executive/financial authority, believes he is removable only for cause, and receives no pressure from city leadership	No unconstitutional risk of bias; summary judgment for City affirmed
Prosecutor bias	Prosecutor paid per session and at‑will could be incentivized to generate revenue	Prosecutor’s pay is not tied to caseload, he lacks budget authority and was not pressured to produce revenue	No unconstitutional risk of bias; summary judgment for City affirmed
Police bias	Large police budget share plus city reliance on fines creates incentive for officers to over‑cite	Officers are salaried, no quotas, funding tied to projected expenses, and penalty funds are distributed across departments	No unconstitutional risk of bias; summary judgment for City affirmed
Code enforcement bias	Private code officers exercise citation discretion and rising citations suggest revenue motive	Contractor is paid hourly, contributes <10% of fines revenue, operates at a loss, and lacks city executive authority	No unconstitutional risk of bias; summary judgment for City affirmed

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (extreme facts can create a constitutionally intolerable probability of judicial bias)
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (judge disqualified where he had a direct pecuniary interest in convictions)
Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) (mayor’s executive financial responsibilities can create unconstitutional bias when acting as adjudicator)
Dugan v. Ohio, 277 U.S. 61 (1928) (adjudicator without executive financial authority is not disqualified by city’s financial interests)
Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980) (different standards of neutrality apply to prosecutors and enforcement officials; personal financial interests raise serious due‑process concerns)
Harper v. Professional Probation Servs., Inc., 976 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2020) (entity with a profit‑maximizing policy that affects individual adjudications can create unconstitutional bias)
Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987) (prosecutors need not be entirely neutral and detached)
Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d 1346 (7th Cir. 1997) (rejection of due‑process claim based on generalized reappointment pressure)
Brown v. Vance, 637 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1981) (selection/competition among judges for cases can create due‑process concerns)