Hike v. State
297 Neb. 212
| Neb. | 2017Background
- The Hikes owned property from which the State condemned 1.05 acres for U.S. Highway 75 in 2008; a jury determined compensation and this Court affirmed in Hike I.
- In August 2011, construction near the Hikes’ house caused alleged structural damage (brick veneer), which experts estimated at about $51,829.
- At the condemnation trial the Hikes sought to introduce evidence of that post-taking structural damage; the trial court excluded it on motion in limine and this Court affirmed in Hike I, concluding the damage occurred after the taking and was not proximately caused by it.
- The Hikes did not amend their complaint to assert an inverse-condemnation claim at trial or within a year after the in limine ruling; instead they raised the damage issue on appeal in Hike I.
- On April 17, 2015 the Hikes filed a separate inverse condemnation action against the State claiming the August 2011 damage; the State moved for summary judgment asserting the 2-year statute of limitations in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-218.
- The district court granted summary judgment for the State, holding the claim accrued in August 2011 and was barred by § 25-218; the Hikes appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether judicial estoppel bars the State from raising a limitations defense | State previously told trial court the Hikes should bring structural-damage claims separately; that is inconsistent with raising a limitations defense now | State’s prior position concerned admissibility in condemnation trial and did not preclude later relying on limitations; no bad faith shown | Judicial estoppel does not apply; State may assert the statute of limitations |
| Which statute of limitations governs inverse-condemnation claims against the State | § 25-202 (10-year) is more analogous and should govern inverse-condemnation claims | § 25-218 (2-year) applies to claims against the State and is the more specific statutory expression when the State is defendant | § 25-218 (2-year) governs inverse-condemnation claims against the State |
| When did the Hikes’ inverse-condemnation cause of action accrue / were they timely | The inverse-condemnation claim was effectively “brought” in Hike I, so within 2 years | Claim accrued in August 2011 when damage occurred; no separate inverse-condemnation suit was filed until April 17, 2015 | Cause accrued August 2011; claim filed April 2015 is time-barred under § 25-218 |
| Whether the Hikes can rely on article I, § 21 (self-executing constitutional right) to avoid limitations | Constitutional right to just compensation is self-executing and should control timing | Argument was not properly assigned/raised on appeal; procedural default | Constitutional-timing argument not considered because not assigned in initial brief; limitations bar stands |
Key Cases Cited
- Hike v. State, 288 Neb. 60, 846 N.W.2d 205 (2014) (affirming exclusion of post-taking structural-damage evidence in condemnation trial)
- Bordy v. State, 142 Neb. 714, 7 N.W.2d 632 (1943) (applied 2-year limitations for takings claims against the State)
- Czarnick v. Loup River P. P. Dist., 190 Neb. 521, 209 N.W.2d 595 (1973) (inverse-condemnation claim timing against State analyzed under § 25-218)
- Krambeck v. City of Gretna, 198 Neb. 608, 254 N.W.2d 691 (1977) (held 10-year § 25-202 applies to inverse-condemnation claims against local governments)
- Steuben v. City of Lincoln, 249 Neb. 270, 543 N.W.2d 161 (1996) (applied § 25-202 to actions under article I, § 21 against municipal defendant)
- Sports Courts of Omaha v. Meginnis, 242 Neb. 768, 497 N.W.2d 38 (1993) (discusses effect of pending appeal on trial-court jurisdiction)