Hike v. State
297 Neb. 212
| Neb. | 2017Background
- The Hikes owned property from which the State took 1.05 acres by condemnation for Highway 75; a jury decided compensation and this Court affirmed in Hike I.
- During pretrial construction (August 2011) heavy machinery allegedly caused structural damage to the Hikes’ home; experts estimated about $51,829 in damage.
- At the condemnation trial the Hikes attempted to offer evidence of that post-taking structural damage; the district court excluded it on motion in limine and this Court affirmed in Hike I, holding the damage was not the proximate result of the taking.
- The Hikes did not amend their complaint to assert an inverse-condemnation claim during the original proceeding or seek leave to do so; instead they appealed the evidentiary ruling and later (April 17, 2015) filed a separate inverse-condemnation suit against the State.
- The State moved for summary judgment arguing the Hikes’ inverse-condemnation claim was time-barred by the 2-year statute in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-218; the district court granted summary judgment and the Hikes appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the State is judicially estopped from asserting a statute-of-limitations defense | Hikes: State previously argued the structural-damage claim must be brought separately; estoppel should bar State from later asserting it is time barred | State: Prior argument concerned admissibility at that time, not future timeliness; positions are not inconsistent | Court: No judicial estoppel — State’s prior position on admissibility was not inconsistent and Hikes failed to show bad faith |
| Which statute of limitations applies to inverse-condemnation claims against the State | Hikes: § 25-202 (10-year land action limit) should govern | State: § 25-218 (2-year claims-against-the-State limit) applies because it specifically addresses claims against the State | Court: § 25-218 governs inverse-condemnation claims against the State as the more specific statute |
| When the limitation period for the Hikes’ inverse-condemnation claim accrued and whether bringing the claim in Hike I satisfied § 25-218 | Hikes: Their attempt to present the damage in Hike I constituted bringing the claim within two years | State: ‘‘Bringing an action’’ requires instituting a separate claim; the inverse-condemnation suit was filed in 2015 after the two-year period | Court: The claim accrued in August 2011 and was not brought within two years; the 2015 filing was untimely |
| Whether the Hikes may raise a constitutional (self‑executing) right-to-compensation argument | Hikes: Article I, § 21 gives an unequivocal right to compensation that should overcome limitations treatment | State: (addressed in briefs) | Court: Argument was not properly assigned in the initial brief and was raised too late (reply), so it was not considered |
Key Cases Cited
- Hike v. State, 288 Neb. 60 (affirming exclusion of post‑taking damage evidence in condemnation trial)
- Bordy v. State, 142 Neb. 714 (applying § 25-218 two‑year limit to suits against the State for taking/damaging property)
- Czarnick v. Loup River P. P. Dist., 190 Neb. 521 (inverse‑condemnation suit timing against governmental entity addressed under § 25-218)
- Krambeck v. City of Gretna, 198 Neb. 608 (inverse‑condemnation actions against local government held subject to § 25-202 ten‑year general limit)
- Steuben v. City of Lincoln, 249 Neb. 270 (same principle as Krambeck for municipal defendants)
- Sports Courts of Omaha v. Meginnis, 242 Neb. 768 (general rule on divested jurisdiction during appeal and its limited exceptions)