Hike v. State
297 Neb. 212
| Neb. | 2017Background
- In 2008 the State acquired 1.05 acres of the Hikes’ property by eminent domain for U.S. Highway 75 expansion; dispute over compensation led to Hike I.
- In August 2011 construction work (48-foot cut about 61 feet from the house) allegedly caused structural damage to the Hikes’ residence; experts estimated damage at $51,829.
- At trial in Hike I the Hikes attempted to introduce evidence of the structural damage; the district court excluded it via motion in limine as not proximately caused by the taking. This Court affirmed on appeal in Hike I.
- The Hikes did not amend their complaint in Hike I to assert an inverse-condemnation claim; instead they appealed the evidentiary ruling.
- The Hikes filed a separate inverse-condemnation complaint against the State on April 17, 2015. The State moved for summary judgment asserting Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-218’s 2-year limitations bar; the district court granted summary judgment and dismissed the complaint.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is the State judicially estopped from invoking the statute-of-limitations defense because it previously argued the Hikes should bring a separate action? | The State previously told the trial court that the structural-damage claim should be brought as a separate action, so it cannot now argue that such a separate action is time-barred. | The State’s prior arguments in Hike I concerned admissibility and proximate cause, not the timeliness of a separate suit; no inconsistency or bad-faith showing. | No judicial estoppel — State may assert the statute-of-limitations defense. |
| Which statute of limitations applies to inverse-condemnation claims against the State: § 25-218 (2 years) or § 25-202 (10 years)? | § 25-202 (10 years) should govern as the more appropriate limitation for land/takings claims. | § 25-218 (2 years) specifically governs claims against the State and is therefore the more specific statute. | § 25-218 (2 years) applies to inverse-condemnation claims against the State. |
| When did the Hikes’ inverse-condemnation claim accrue and did they "bring" the action within the 2-year period by raising evidence in Hike I? | The Hikes contended they effectively brought the claim in Hike I (so within 2 years). | An action is ‘‘brought’’ by suing or instituting proceedings on that claim; Hike I did not assert a separate inverse-condemnation complaint or amend to add the claim. | The cause accrued in August 2011; the inverse-condemnation complaint was not filed until April 17, 2015, so the claim is time-barred under § 25-218. |
| Can the Hikes’ constitutional argument (self-executing right to compensation under Neb. Const. art. I, § 21) be entertained on appeal? | The right is self-executing, so limitations should not bar compensation. | The Hikes failed to assign that constitutional error in their initial brief; the argument was raised first in reply and is untimely. | Court did not consider the constitutional argument because it was not properly assigned/briefed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hike v. State, 288 Neb. 60, 846 N.W.2d 205 (2014) (affirming exclusion of post-taking structural-damage evidence)
- Bordy v. State, 142 Neb. 714, 7 N.W.2d 632 (1943) (holding 2-year limitations for suits against the State for taking/damaging property)
- Czarnick v. Loup River P. P. Dist., 190 Neb. 521, 209 N.W.2d 595 (1973) (applying limitations to takings claims)
- Krambeck v. City of Gretna, 198 Neb. 608, 254 N.W.2d 691 (1977) (applying 10-year limitation for inverse-condemnation claims not against the State)
- Steuben v. City of Lincoln, 249 Neb. 270, 543 N.W.2d 161 (1996) (treating inverse-condemnation claims against local government under § 25-202)
- Sports Courts of Omaha v. Meginnis, 242 Neb. 768, 497 N.W.2d 38 (1993) (jurisdictional rule regarding appeals and pending actions)