Higgs v. Diversified Consultants, Inc.
4:13-cv-00278
W.D. Mo.Apr 8, 2014Background
- Plaintiff Richard Higgs had an AT&T Mobility account that went into default and was referred to Diversified Consultants, a debt collector.
- Diversified spoke with Higgs on January 21, 2013 (recorded) and February 7, 2013; between those dates Diversified made 36 calls to Higgs (avg. 2.25/day; no more than four/day) during protected hours.
- On January 21 Higgs told the caller he did not have money and “can’t do anything”; the agent marked the account CNP (cannot pay) and told him collection activity would continue.
- On February 7 Higgs called in and asked Diversified to stop calling; Diversified ceased calls thereafter.
- Higgs sued under the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d and 1692d(5), alleging the calls between Jan. 21 and Feb. 7 were made with intent to harass, oppress, or abuse.
- Diversified moved for summary judgment arguing (1) calls sought payment information, (2) Higgs never expressly asked calls to stop during the period, (3) call volume/pattern was not excessive, and (4) recorded calls contained no abusive content.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether calls between Jan. 21–Feb. 7 violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692d (harassment) | Calls after Higgs said he couldn’t pay were intended to harass him | Calls were legitimate attempts to determine when Higgs could pay; no abusive content | Court granted summary judgment for defendant — no violation of §1692d |
| Whether call volume/pattern violated § 1692d(5) | 36 calls in 16 days amounted to harassment | Volume (avg 2.25/day; ≤4/day; during protected hours) was reasonable | Court found volume/pattern insufficient to show harassment |
| Whether failure to expressly request calls to stop defeats claim | Higgs’s statement he couldn’t pay sufficed as implicit request to stop | Higgs never explicitly asked calls to cease during period; collector told him calls would continue | Court held Higgs did not explicitly request cessation; implicit statement insufficient |
| Whether a reasonable jury could find intent to harass | Argues intent can be inferred from persistence | Argues no evidence of intent beyond ordinary collection efforts | Court: no genuine issue of material fact on intent; summary judgment for defendant |
Key Cases Cited
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary judgment standard)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (summary judgment — genuine issue standard)
- Peters v. Gen. Serv. Bureau, Inc., 277 F.3d 1051 (8th Cir. 2002) (unsophisticated consumer standard under FDCPA)
- Pace v. Portfolio Recovery, 872 F. Supp. 2d 861 (W.D. Mo. 2012) (persistence alone not automatically harassment under §1692d)
- Fausto v. Credigy Servs. Corp., 598 F. Supp. 2d 1049 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (example of facts supporting harassment finding)
- Durthaler v. Accounts Receivable Mgmt., Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 485 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (collecting cases on call volume and harassment)
