Higgins v. Holder
677 F.3d 97
| 2d Cir. | 2012Background
- Higgins, a Jamaica native and U.S. permanent resident since 1987, was convicted in Connecticut in 2001 of tampering with a witness under CGS § 53a-151 after a jury found he induced a witness to testify falsely; the underlying sexual assault charges were acquitted.
- Higgins was later admitted to the U.S. as a returning permanent resident in 2008; DHS served him a Notice to Appear in 2009 charging removability for crime involving moral turpitude.
- An IJ in 2009 denied Higgins relief and ordered removal, applying Espinoza-Gonzalez to conclude the Connecticut conviction is an aggravated felony because it relates to obstruction of justice.
- The BIA affirmed in 2011, adopting the IJ’s Espinoza-Gonzalez-based analysis and holding CGS § 53a-151 qualifies as an offense relating to obstruction of justice under INA § 1101(a)(43)(S).
- Higgins challenges on appeal whether CGS § 53a-151 is so classified and argues about the proper deference to BIA interpretations and related collateral attacks on his state conviction.
- The Second Circuit ultimately holds that CGS § 53a-151 satisfies the actus reus and mens rea elements of obstruction of justice under the INA, and there is no error in affirming the BIA’s determination, leading to dismissal of the petition for review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether CGS § 53a-151 is an offense relating to obstruction of justice under INA § 1101(a)(43)(S). | Higgins contends the Connecticut statute does not fit the BIA’s obstruction framework. | Higgins' conviction is categorically an obstruction offense under Espinoza-Gonzalez and related law. | Yes; CGS § 53a-151 fits the obstruction category. |
| Whether deference to the BIA’s Espinoza-Gonzalez interpretation is warranted. | Higgins urges limited or no Chevron deference to the BIA. | Government seeks Chevron deference to the BIA’s interpretation. | The court does not definitively resolve deference here but affirms on the basis that CGS § 53a-151 satisfies the obstruction element under the BIA framework. |
| Whether Higgins may collateral attack his state conviction on appeal. | Higgins claims inconsistencies with underlying charges undermine the removal finding. | Collaterally attacking state convictions is not permissible on removal review. | Collateral attacks are not available on petition for review of the BIA’s removal decision. |
Key Cases Cited
- Espinoza-Gonzalez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 889 (BIA 1999) (interprets obstruction of justice for immigration purposes and limits to a narrow set of offenses)
- Oouch v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 633 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2011) (jurisdictional-merger with merits; review of aggravated felony question)
- Mugalli v. Ashcroft, 258 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2001) (limits deference when BIA interprets criminal statutes)
- Denis v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 633 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2011) (rejects BIA narrow view, surveys interrelationship of crimes under obstruction)
- United States v. Pacheco, 225 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2000) (defines 'term of imprisonment' for aggravated felonies)
- United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995) (limits scope of obstruction of justice offenses in federal context)