Higdon v. State
2015 Ala. LEXIS 93
Ala.2015Background
- In summer 2012, 17-year-old Eric Higdon, an intern at a day-care, repeatedly accompanied 4-year-old K.S. to the bathroom and performed oral sex; the child later disclosed the acts.
- A jury convicted Higdon of (1) first-degree sodomy of a child under 12 (§ 13A-6-63(a)(3)) and (2) first-degree sodomy by forcible compulsion (§ 13A-6-63(a)(1)).
- The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction under § 13A-6-63(a)(3) but reversed the forcible-compulsion conviction, finding insufficient evidence that forcible compulsion was shown.
- The State sought review, asking the Alabama Supreme Court to overrule Ex parte J.A.P., which held a juvenile defendant cannot establish forcible compulsion by an implied threat when the offender is a minor in a relationship of trust with the child.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari, reconsidered Ex parte J.A.P., and evaluated whether the child’s perspective and totality of circumstances (age/maturity differential, authority/control) can support an implied-threat finding regardless of the offender’s age.
- The Court overruled Ex parte J.A.P., reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals’ reversal, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Ex parte J.A.P. should be overruled | State: Ex parte J.A.P. wrongly bars proof of forcible compulsion by implied threat when offender is a juvenile | Higdon: Ex parte J.A.P. properly limited implied-threat inference when defendant is a juvenile | Overruled Ex parte J.A.P.; court may consider implied threats from the child victim’s perspective regardless of offender age |
| Whether implied threat can satisfy "forcible compulsion" when defendant is a juvenile | State: Statutory definition of forcible compulsion (threat, express or implied) permits inference based on victim’s perspective and relationship dynamics | Higdon: Age of offender matters; bright-line rule prevents inferring implied threat from juveniles | Court: Focus should be on the victim’s perspective and totality of circumstances (age/maturity gap, authority/control), not solely offender’s age |
| Proper standard for trial-court sufficiency review of implied-threat evidence | State: Use victim-centered totality-of-evidence analysis (as in Powe) to decide whether jury could infer implied threat | Higdon: Trial courts should not infer implied threat from juvenile-offender facts alone | Court: Adopt Powe-style analysis regardless of offender age; trial courts may consider factors like authority, coercion, and victim’s fear |
| Effect on existing statutory scheme distinguishing offenses by age | State: Allowing implied-threat inference fills evidentiary gap where coercion exists despite offender being a juvenile | Higdon: Expansion intrudes on legislative choices about age-based offenses | Court: Judicial role is evidentiary interpretation; court does not rewrite statutes but interprets forcible-compulsion definition to include implied threats evaluated from victim’s perspective |
Key Cases Cited
- Ex parte J.A.P., 853 So.2d 280 (Ala. 2002) (previously held implied-threat inference for forcible compulsion limited to adult offenders)
- Powe v. State, 597 So.2d 721 (Ala. 1991) (held a child’s fear of an adult in authority can support an implied threat for forcible compulsion)
- Higdon v. State, 197 So.3d 1014 (Ala. Crim. App. 2014) (Court of Criminal Appeals opinion reversing forcible-compulsion conviction)
- Ex parte Morrow, 915 So.2d 539 (Ala. 2004) (cited for de novo review of pure legal questions)