2019 Ohio 492
Ohio Ct. App.2019Background
- Two severed mineral reservations underlie adjacent tracts: a 1948 Northam reservation (≈16.922 acres) and a 1957 Lawlis reservation (≈14.024 acres). Holders of those reservations leased to Chesapeake in 2012–2013.
- Appellants (Hickman) purchased the surface in 2008 and filed for declaratory judgment / quiet title in 2013, seeking extinguishment of the Northam reservation under the Ohio Marketable Title Act (MTA) and relying on dormant-mineral arguments for both reservations.
- Appellants did not pursue relief under the 2006 Dormant Mineral Act (DMA). No “savings events” under R.C. 5301.56 occurred before the Chesapeake leases.
- Appellants identified a purported root-of-title deed recorded November 22, 1963 and argued the Northam reservation was not referenced thereafter for 40 years, triggering extinguishment under the MTA.
- Trial court granted summary judgment for mineral-right holders; court of appeals affirmed, holding (1) the 1963 root deed expressly reserved oil and gas so it could not serve to extinguish the reservation under the MTA, and (2) the constitutional/takings arguments (relying on Corban) fail because the DMA’s evidentiary presumption is procedural, not a vested property right.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Northam severed mineral interest was extinguished under the MTA given a 1963 root deed | Hickman: 1963 root deed (recorded 11/22/1963) did not specifically reference the Northam reservation thereafter for 40 years, so MTA extinguished the reservation | Northam/others: the 1963 deed expressly reserved oil & gas; a root deed containing an oil-and-gas reservation cannot serve to extinguish that interest | Court: Root deed contains an oil-and-gas reservation repeated in the chain, so MTA extinguishment does not apply; summary judgment for appellees affirmed |
| Whether Appellants could circumvent the 2006 DMA and rely on the MTA instead | Hickman: alternative MTA claim should be available to extinguish the reservation | Appellees: Appellants must use 2006 DMA procedures; further, their root deed fails under MTA anyway | Court: Even assuming alternative pleading, MTA fails because root deed reserved minerals; Appellants’ lack of 2006 DMA claim is dispositive for DMA relief |
| Whether Corban’s “conclusive presumption of abandonment” created a constitutionally protected vested property right (Takings or Due Process) | Hickman: Corban recognized a presumption that effectively allowed acquisition of abandoned minerals; removing or altering that presumption violates the U.S. Constitution | Appellees: Corban treated the presumption as an evidentiary/procedural device, not a vested substantive property right; later statute changes do not effect a taking | Court: Corban and subsequent authority hold the presumption is evidentiary; Appellants had at most contingent, non-vested rights and no unconstitutional taking occurred |
| Whether summary judgment standard was properly applied | Hickman: disputed facts about chain of title and reservations precluded summary judgment | Appellees: undisputed record shows reservation language in root deed and chain; no genuine issue of material fact | Court: de novo review finds no genuine issue; summary judgment for defendants proper |
Key Cases Cited
- Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102 (Ohio 1996) (standard for de novo appellate review of summary judgment)
- Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280 (Ohio 1996) (movant’s and nonmovant’s burdens in summary judgment practice)
- Corban v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., 147 Ohio St.3d 197 (Ohio 2016) (1989 DMA’s conclusive presumption is evidentiary, not a vested substantive property right)
- Blackstone v. Moore, 153 Ohio St.3d 225 (Ohio 2018) (royalty interests may be subject to both MTA and DMA analysis)
- Toth v. Berks Title Ins. Co., 6 Ohio St.3d 338 (Ohio 1983) (an interest in record that appears in title muniments is not extinguished by MTA)
- Ackison v. Anchor Packing Co., 120 Ohio St.3d 228 (Ohio 2008) (distinguishing procedural evidentiary rules from substantive vested rights)