426 P.3d 480
Idaho2018Background
- Joyce Herrett suffered a stroke from an air embolism during removal of a central venous catheter (CVC) at St. Luke’s; St. Luke’s admitted its nurse breached the standard of care.
- Plaintiffs (Rodney and Joyce Herrett) sought a jury determination on whether the conduct was reckless and on damages; jury returned about $3.85M later adjusted to $3,775,864.21.
- Key trial disputes: scope of expert testimony from treating physician Dr. Kim Wiggins (redirect about encephalomalacia), admissibility of life‑care planner Debra DeMint‑Lee’s future‑care opinions, and scope of rebuttal expert Dr. Carl Goldstein’s testimony responding to defendant expert Dr. Stuart Shankland.
- St. Luke’s moved for mistrial based on Wiggins’ redirect testimony and challenged several experts under I.R.C.P. 26 and I.R.E. 703.
- The district court admitted the contested expert testimony and gave the plaintiffs’ proposed instruction defining “reckless.”
- On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in evidentiary rulings or in the recklessness instruction; no appellate attorney fees were awarded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Dr. Wiggins’ redirect opinion on encephalomalacia | Redirect was proper because St. Luke’s opened door on cross‑examination | Disclosure rules required exclusion as outside pretrial expert disclosure | Court: Admit; testimony was within scope opened by cross‑examination; mistrial denied (invited error) |
| Admissibility of Dr. Goldstein’s rebuttal testimony | Disclosure reasonably described his rebuttal to Dr. Shankland and basis for opinion | Disclosure insufficiently specific about which publications he'd attack and how | Court: Admit; disclosure met I.R.C.P. 26 requirements in context; no abuse of discretion |
| Foundation for DeMint‑Lee’s life‑care opinions | Her review of records and consultation with providers was a proper basis under I.R.E. 703 | Insufficient foundation because she hadn’t directly consulted treating physician | Court: Admit; foundation adequate and any error harmless given other supporting testimony |
| Jury instruction defining “reckless” | Proposed instruction accurately stated objective law and was clearer than IDJI | Instruction deviated from pattern (IDJI 2.25) and risked lowering plaintiff’s burden | Court: Affirm; instruction was an accurate, permissible statement of law and met I.R.C.P. 51(g) |
Key Cases Cited
- Radmer v. Ford Motor Co., 120 Idaho 86 (1991) (undisclosed expert opinions developed pretrial must be disclosed; late disclosure may justify exclusion)
- Sanville v. State, 593 P.2d 1340 (Wyo. 1979) (redirect may be used to rebut matters opened by cross‑examination; "opening the door" doctrine)
- Hennefer v. Blaine Cnty. Sch. Dist., 158 Idaho 242 (2015) (recklessness is an objective standard; actor need not subjectively perceive risk)
- Carillo v. Boise Tire Co. Inc., 152 Idaho 741 (2012) (reckless misconduct involves intentional conduct and knowledge of substantial risk)
- Van Brunt v. Stoddard, 136 Idaho 681 (2001) (mistrial decision is discretionary; reversal requires abuse of that discretion)
