Hernandez v. Pistotnik
494 P.3d 203
| Kan. Ct. App. | 2021Background
- Yudi Hernandez (a minor) sued Brad and Brian Pistotnik for fraud and KCPA violations arising from advertising; summary judgment for Brad and Brian was granted and affirmed on appeal.
- During litigation the court entered an amended protective order designating Brad’s deposition transcript confidential and restricting use to the underlying cases (16 CV 285 and 16 CV 172).
- After summary judgment and while the appeal was pending, Brave (Yudi’s attorney and former AAPLO employee) sought to declassify and add Brad’s full deposition to the appellate record and to use it in two other suits Brave was prosecuting.
- Brave improperly filed an unsealed copy of the deposition with the clerk, prompting multiple motions by Brad to enforce the protective order; the district court held hearings, found violation(s), and awarded attorney fees/sanctions against Brave ($2,100 and $3,000).
- On appeal this court addressed jurisdiction and standing questions, held the district court retained authority to enforce its protective order post-judgment, found Yudi lacked standing to appeal most protective-order rulings, allowed Brave to appeal sanctions against him, and affirmed the sanctions as not an abuse of discretion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Court's authority to act on protective-order disputes after appeal filed | Brave/Yudi argued the district court lost jurisdiction once the summary-judgment appeal was docketed | Brad argued the court retained power to enforce/modify protective order as a collateral matter | Court: District court retains jurisdiction to enforce (but not expand) protective orders postjudgment; enforcement is collateral to merits and permissible. |
| Appealability/finality of postjudgment protective-order rulings | Brave/Yudi implied these were not final and thus not appealable | Brad maintained the orders were final decisions as to the protective-order disputes | Court: Postjudgment enforcement orders are final for appeal purposes (separate collateral proceedings). |
| Standing of Yudi to appeal protective-order rulings or sanctions | Yudi asserted injury from limits on use of deposition and from being subpoenaed | Brad argued Yudi suffered no cognizable injury and thus lacks standing | Court: Yudi lacks standing — protective-order limits did not prejudice the outcome and subpoena appearance did not create cognizable injury. |
| Standing and scope of Brave's appeals; and sanctions validity | Brave claimed he could appeal discovery rulings and sanctions and that sanctions were unauthorized/unreasonable | Brad argued Brave lacked standing to challenge discovery rulings affecting other cases but could be sanctioned; statutes authorize fee awards for motions to enforce protective orders | Court: Brave has standing to appeal sanctions against him but lacks standing to appeal non‑sanction discovery rulings affecting other, separate cases; sanctions under K.S.A. 60-226/60-237 were authorized and not an abuse of discretion. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Estate of Robinson, 232 Kan. 752 (1983) (trial court may allow attorney fees while appeal pending)
- United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424 (10th Cir. 1990) (district court retains power to modify/enforce protective orders after case end)
- FutureFuel Chemical Co. v. Lonza, Inc., 756 F.3d 641 (8th Cir. 2014) (unsealing records is collateral to merits; district court may resolve)
- Lancaster v. Independent School Dist. No. 5, 149 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 1998) (district court retains jurisdiction over attorney-fee/sanctions matters while appeal pending)
- Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196 (1988) (attorney-fee determinations are collateral to merits)