Hernandez v. McIntosh, 1:22-cv-02266

Pedro Hernandez was convicted in New York State court for murdering and kidnapping six-year-old Etan Patz in a case built almost entirely on Hernandez's confessions after decades-old investigations yielded no physical evidence.
Hernandez, who had a history of mental illness and low IQ, was interrogated for roughly seven hours without Miranda warnings before first confessing, then was Mirandized and asked to repeat his confession on video, and later to an Assistant District Attorney (ADA).
During his second trial, the jury asked the trial judge if finding the initial, pre-Miranda confession involuntary required disregarding the subsequent confessions; the judge simply answered “no.”
Hernandez appealed, arguing that this instruction violated the Supreme Court’s holding in Missouri v. Seibert, which limits the admissibility of post-warning confessions following an initial unwarned confession unless curative measures are taken.
The state appellate court held the instruction was correct, or alternatively harmless, and the federal district court agreed there was error but found habeas relief foreclosed by AEDPA’s deferential standards. The Second Circuit reversed, finding the error both contrary to federal law and not harmless.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was the trial court's jury instruction inconsistent with Seibert and thus unconstitutional?	The instruction ignored Seibert by failing to inform the jury it could or must disregard post-warning confessions if the initial confession was involuntary.	The state instruction was correct or, at most, harmless because later confessions were attenuated from the initial one.	The instruction was contrary to clearly established federal law under Seibert.
Was the error in the instruction harmless?	The erroneous instruction prejudiced the verdict, given the centrality of the confessions to the conviction and the weak overall case.	Any error was harmless given the attenuation and the independent strength of the prosecution’s case.	The error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; it had a substantial and injurious effect.
Does AEDPA preclude habeas relief in this scenario?	AEDPA’s deferential standard is met because every fair-minded jurist would find the error prejudicial here.	The state court’s alternative harmless-error holding bars relief under AEDPA.	Habeas relief is warranted even under AEDPA’s strict standard.
Should Hernandez receive habeas relief?	The writ should be conditionally granted, requiring a new trial unless the state retries Hernandez timely.	No relief is appropriate; conviction should stand.	Conditional grant of habeas: release unless new trial is provided.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966) (requires law enforcement to provide Miranda warnings before custodial interrogation)
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (U.S. 2004) (involuntary, two-step interrogations render post-warning confessions inadmissible unless curative measures are taken)
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (U.S. 1993) (sets standard for harmless error on habeas review: must show actual prejudice)
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (U.S. 1967) (harmless error must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt for conviction to stand)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (U.S. 2011) (explains highly deferential review standard under AEDPA for federal habeas petitions)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (U.S. 2000) (defines “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” under AEDPA)