241 F. Supp. 3d 959
N.D. Cal.2017Background
- Plaintiffs (attendees of a June 2, 2016 Trump rally in San Jose) allege police directed them to exit via a single east-northeast route that funneled them into anti-Trump protesters, where many were assaulted.
- Plaintiffs sued the City of San Jose, Chief Edgardo Garcia, several named officers, and others, asserting § 1983 (state-created danger / Fourteenth Amendment), Monell, Bane Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1), and negligence claims.
- FAC alleges (a) Garcia and others devised a crowd-control plan, (b) officers on scene knowingly continued to direct attendees into danger, and (c) Garcia later praised officers’ “restraint,” amounting to ratification.
- Procedural history: the court previously granted in part a first motion to dismiss and warned that failure to cure specified deficiencies could lead to dismissal with prejudice; Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint and the City Defendants filed a second motion to dismiss.
- Court’s disposition: dismissed with prejudice § 1983 claims against Garcia (failure to allege deliberate indifference in creating danger) and certain Monell/failure-to-train and pre-rally policy theories; denied dismissal as to § 1983 claims against on-scene officers for conduct after they became aware of danger and denied dismissal as to City Monell liability based on post-rally ratification; dismissed Bane Act claims with prejudice; negligence claim survived (court declined to consider § 820.2 immunity because it was not timely raised).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Plaintiffs plausibly alleged a § 1983 state-created danger claim against Chief Garcia for devising the crowd-control plan | Garcia devised the plan despite knowing prior Trump rallies had violence and edited a “zero tolerance” advisory; this shows deliberate indifference to a known danger | Garcia argues plaintiffs failed to plead actual knowledge/willful blindness that the plan would place attendees in a worse position than no police plan; mere poor planning is not a constitutional violation | Dismissed with prejudice — allegations insufficient to show Garcia recognized and intended to expose plaintiffs to an increased danger |
| Whether Plaintiffs plausibly alleged a § 1983 state-created danger claim against on-scene officers (named lieutenants/captain and Does) for directing attendees into the crowd after violence began | Officers knew assaults had occurred that night yet continued directing attendees into the designated exit path, thereby affirmatively placing them in danger | Defendants contend crowd-control decisions are discretionary and nonaction does not create constitutional liability; qualified immunity applies | Denied dismissal as to officers for conduct during/after the rally — plaintiffs pleaded facts that officers on scene knew of assaults and continued the route; qualified immunity denied without prejudice to be revisited later |
| Whether the City is liable under Monell based on pre-rally policies or failure to train | City’s documents/policy changes and failure to train (despite reports of violence at other rallies) caused the constitutional injury | City argues no official policy or training failure caused a constitutional violation; pre-rally plans alone don’t establish Monell liability | Dismissed with prejudice as to Monell claims grounded on pre-rally policies and failure to train; however Monell claim survives to the extent based on Garcia’s post-rally ratification of officers’ conduct |
| Whether Plaintiffs stated a Bane Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1) claim against City and officers | By forcing exits, preventing safer egress, and failing to assist, defendants interfered with constitutional rights by threats, intimidation or coercion | Defendants argue no affirmative threats/intimidation — mere direction/closure of exits and nonintervention are not coercion; coercion required beyond the minimal coercion inherent in police orders | Dismissed with prejudice — plaintiffs failed to allege threats, intimidation, or coercion beyond the coercion inherent in the alleged constitutional violation |
| Whether Plaintiffs’ negligence claim should be dismissed because City employees’ conduct is protected by Govt. Code § 820.2 discretionary-act immunity | Plaintiffs maintain negligence claim based on officers’ on-scene conduct | City raises § 820.2 immunity in second motion | Court refused to consider § 820.2 (defense was available but not raised in the first motion); negligence claim against City based on officers’ on-scene actions survives; Garcia-based pre-rally negligence struck as procedurally improper |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (pleading must state a plausible claim)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (legal conclusions not entitled to assumption of truth)
- DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (no general constitutional duty to protect from private violence)
- Johnson v. City of Seattle, 474 F.3d 634 (9th Cir.) (state-created danger and crowd-control planning analysis)
- L.W. v. Grubbs, 92 F.3d 894 (9th Cir.) (deliberate indifference standard for state-created danger)
- Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir.) (state-created danger clearly established)
- Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (municipal liability requires policy/custom causing constitutional tort)
- City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (failure-to-train deliberate indifference standard)
- Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (pattern of violations ordinarily required for failure-to-train liability)
- Lyall v. City of Los Angeles, 807 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir.) (Bane Act requires coercion beyond coercion inherent in detention/search)