Hernandez v. Amcord, Inc.
215 Cal. App. 4th 659
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2013Background
- Hernandez, as plaintiff and successor in interest to decedent, sues Amcord for asbestos-related injuries, alleging negligence and strict liability stemming from decedent’s mesothelioma diagnosed in 2008 and death in 2009.
- Riverside gun plastic cement, manufactured by Amcord and containing asbestos, was used by Hernandez and his brother Alfredo during construction work in the 1960s–1970s, with frequent exposure and creation of visible dust.
- The product contained asbestos, had no cancer warning, and Amcord complied with asbestos regulations; Riverside was the only Amcord product implicated.
- Trial began with Amcord as the remaining defendant; the court granted nonsuit after evidence, holding that causation evidence did not meet Rutherford’s reasonable medical probability standard.
- Appellant presented expert epidemiology and pathology testimony linking asbestos exposure to mesothelioma and identifying Riverside gun plastic cement as a substantial factor, and sought to admit evidence of Amcord’s lobbying activities.
- The appellate court reverses the nonsuit and the evidentiary exclusion, holding that Rutherford-based causation can be proven with the presented evidence and that Noerr-Pennington does not bar admissibility of lobbying evidence; remand for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is there sufficient causation evidence under Rutherford for asbestos-related cancer? | Hernandez argues exposure to Riverside cement was a substantial factor in causing mesothelioma. | Amcord contends the epidemiologist did not testify to a reasonable degree of medical probability that the product caused the illness. | Yes; sufficient evidence to show substantial factor causation under Rutherford. |
| Is lobbying evidence admissible under Noerr-Pennington in a negligence/strict liability case? | Hernandez argues lobbying evidence is relevant to knowledge and danger of the product. | Amcord argues Noerr-Pennington bars such evidence as a rule of evidence. | Yes; Noerr-Pennington is not a blanket evidentiary bar; trial court abused discretion by excluding such evidence. |
Key Cases Cited
- Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 16 Cal.4th 953 (Cal. 1997) (sets causation standard for asbestos-related cancer: substantial factor in reasonable medical probability)
- Lineaweaver v. Plant Insulation Co., 31 Cal.App.4th 1409 (Cal.App.4th 1995) (reaffirms broad substantial-factor test and exposure-based causation)
- Whitmire v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 184 Cal.App.4th 1078 (Cal.App.4th 2010) (requires proof that exposure to defendant's asbestos was a substantial factor)
- Whiteley v. Philip Morris, Inc., 117 Cal.App.4th 635 (Cal.App.4th 2004) (discusses medical probability and increased risk; cautions not to equate increased risk with causation)
- Cottle v. Superior Court, 3 Cal.App.4th 1367 (Cal.App.4th 1992) (toxic tort causation standards and expert reliance (pre-Rutherford))
- Pennington (United Mine Workers v. Pennington), 381 U.S. 657 (U.S. 1965) (Noerr-Pennington doctrine shields lobbying/petitioning activity from antitrust liability; evidence may be admissible)
- Eastern R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (U.S. 1961) (Noerr governs petitioning government without liability; basis for Noerr-Pennington)