Herman Grant Co., Inc. v. Jo Ann Washington
214 So. 3d 266
| Miss. | 2017Background
- On May 29, 2013 a Load Cell Pod assembly from a Weigh Pod system shipped by Herman Grant (TN) and Coti (AL) collapsed at Dunn Road Builders in Laurel, Mississippi, injuring Bradford and Carl Washington (who later died).
- Bradford and the Estate sued Herman Grant and Coti for defective product, alleging design and manufacture defects occurred in Tennessee and Alabama but the injury occurred in Jones County, Mississippi.
- Plaintiffs filed suit in Jasper County (First Judicial District) relying on Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3(1)(b) because one plaintiff (Derrick Jones) was a Jasper County resident and defendants were nonresidents without Mississippi agents.
- Herman Grant moved to transfer venue to the Second Judicial District of Jones County, arguing § 11-11-3(1)(a) permitted venue where a substantial event that caused the injury occurred (the accident in Laurel, Jones County).
- The trial court denied the transfer, accepting plaintiffs’ assertion that the substantial acts (design/manufacture) occurred out of state and giving plaintiffs the benefit of reasonable doubt about venue facts.
- The Mississippi Supreme Court reviewed de novo whether a permissible venue existed under § 11-11-3(1)(a) and concluded the accident in Laurel was a “substantial event that caused the injury,” so Jones County was the proper venue; reversed and remanded for transfer.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether venue in Jasper County was proper under § 11-11-3 when the alleged defective design/manufacture occurred out-of-state but the injurious event occurred in Jones County | Plaintiffs argued venue may be Jasper County under § 11-11-3(1)(b) because defendants are nonresidents and a plaintiff resides there; the substantial acts occurred out-of-state so (a) does not apply | Herman Grant argued § 11-11-3(1)(a) gives venue where a substantial event causing the injury occurred (Jones County), so plaintiffs may not rely on (b) when (a) provides a permissible venue | Court held venue proper in Jones County: the accident in Laurel was a substantial event causing the injury under § 11-11-3(1)(a), so transfer must be ordered |
Key Cases Cited
- Merch. v. Forest Family Practice Clinic, P.A., 67 So. 3d 747 (2011) (abuse-of-discretion standard for venue-transfer denials)
- Crenshaw v. Roman, 942 So. 2d 806 (2006) (same standard cited)
- Park on Lakeland Drive, Inc. v. Spence, 941 So. 2d 203 (2006) (appellate review of venue rulings)
- Austin v. Wells, 919 So. 2d 961 (2006) (standards for disturbing trial court discretion)
- Hedgepeth v. Johnson, 975 So. 2d 235 (2008) (statutory interpretation of § 11-11-3; four mandatory venue options)
- Forrest County Gen. Hosp. v. Conway, 700 So. 2d 324 (1997) (plaintiff’s prerogative to choose among permissible venues)
- Purdue Pharma, L.P. v. Estate of Heffner, 904 So. 2d 100 (2004) (deference to plaintiff’s venue choice absent weighty reasons)
- Bayer Corp. v. Reed, 932 So. 2d 786 (2006) (venue analysis and plaintiff forum choice)
- Holmes v. McMillan, 21 So. 3d 614 (2009) (accident location is the substantial event causing injury for venue)
- Med. Assurance Co. of Miss. v. Myers, 956 So. 2d 213 (2007) (cannot aggregate acts across jurisdictions to manufacture venue)
