Herbert Williams v. City of Chicago, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 21888

Background

At ~2:30 a.m. on Nov. 18, 2009, Herbert Williams smelled smoke, found 11144 S. Edbrooke on fire, and banged on the locked front door to rouse any occupants; he did not enter the house.
Officers O’Brien and Byrne arrived, encountered Williams on the front porch, forced open the locked door, and observed multiple small fires and burned newspaper in wall insulation.
Prosecutor declined to charge Williams with arson after Detective Janice Govern investigated and reported no chemical accelerant and that the house was unoccupied; officers then charged Williams with criminal trespass.
The trespass charge was quickly dismissed; Williams sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest (Fourth Amendment) and under Illinois law for malicious prosecution against the officers and the City.
The district court granted summary judgment for defendants; the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that genuine disputes of material fact precluded summary judgment on probable cause, qualified immunity, and malice for malicious prosecution.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was there probable cause to arrest Williams?	No — Williams was on the porch trying to warn occupants; mere presence does not create probable cause.	Yes — officers observed circumstances suggesting arson (multiple points of origin, arranged wood) and Williams was in position to have set it.	No genuine probable cause on plaintiff’s version of facts; presence alone insufficient; issue for jury.
Are officers entitled to qualified immunity for the arrest?	No — arrest violated clearly established right against arrest without probable cause; no reasonable mistake available given only presence on porch.	Yes — even if probable cause lacked, a reasonable officer could have (arguably) believed probable cause existed based on fire observations.	Denied on summary judgment: no reasonable, arguable probable cause as a matter of law on these facts; qualified immunity not appropriate at this stage.
Was there probable cause to charge Williams with criminal trespass (malicious prosecution element)?	No — officers lacked an honest and sound suspicion that Williams entered or remained inside; he testified he never entered.	Yes — same facts supporting arson suspicion support reasonable suspicion of trespass.	Jury could find absence of probable cause; question not resolved as matter of law.
Was the trespass prosecution initiated with malice?	Yes — evidence (inconsistent officer statements, possible fabrication about seeing Williams exit, unexplained gasoline odor appearing only later, Byrne’s comment that charge would be thrown out) permits inference of improper motive.	No — officers acted in good faith based on their observations; no evidence of improper motive.	Malice is a fact question for the jury; district court erred by requiring plaintiff to "clearly prove" lack of probable cause.

Key Cases Cited

Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (establishes the probable-cause standard for arrests)
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (two-step qualified immunity framework)
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224 (arguable probable cause can support qualified immunity)
Gonzalez v. City of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526 (7th Cir.) (probable cause standard and malicious prosecution elements)
Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392 (7th Cir.) (probable cause as absolute defense to §1983 false-arrest claim)
United States v. Reed, 443 F.3d 600 (7th Cir.) (probable cause is a fluid common-sense concept)
United States v. Ingrao, 897 F.2d 860 (7th Cir.) (mere proximity to crime insufficient for probable cause)
United States v. Richards, 719 F.3d 746 (7th Cir.) (mere proximity does not, without more, generate probable cause)
United States v. Bohman, 683 F.3d 861 (7th Cir.) (suspicion about place does not transfer to everyone who leaves it)
Thayer v. Chiczewski, 705 F.3d 237 (7th Cir.) (arguable probable cause / qualified immunity discussion)