Herbert Slinker v. Jim Beam Brands
689 F. App'x 406
| 6th Cir. | 2017Background
- Herbert Slinker worked as a unionized forklift operator for Jim Beam (2007–2014) under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that included a Drug Free Work Place article authorizing post-accident drug testing for accidents involving operator control and significant property damage.
- On January 6, 2014, Slinker had a forklift accident that damaged cases on a pallet; he submitted to a urinalysis that tested positive for marijuana, then provided a second sample (results not pleaded).
- Jim Beam discharged Slinker the same day; Slinker alleges the employer violated the CBA’s drug-testing procedures and also claims age discrimination under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, alleging younger employees were treated differently.
- The district court granted summary judgment for Jim Beam, concluding Slinker failed to properly oppose the motion below and that his age-discrimination claim was preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act because resolution required interpreting the CBA; the court then dismissed the claim as time-barred under § 301 (Slinker does not challenge the statute-of-limitations ruling on appeal).
- On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed: it found Slinker forfeited new arguments for failing to present them below and held the age-discrimination claim was preempted because adjudication depended on interpreting the CBA’s drug-testing provisions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Slinker’s Kentucky age-discrimination claim is preempted by § 301 because resolution requires interpreting the CBA | Slinker contends Jim Beam violated state anti-discrimination law by firing him while inconsistently enforcing the drug-testing policy against younger employees; he alleges Jim Beam violated the CBA’s procedures when testing him and a younger coworker | Jim Beam argued the claim is governed by the CBA and thus § 301 preempts the state-law claim because resolution requires interpreting the contract’s drug-testing terms | Court held the claim is preempted: adjudication requires interpretation of the CBA’s drug-testing provisions, so § 301 applies |
| Whether appellate review should consider arguments Slinker did not present below (forfeiture/miscarriage of justice) | Slinker attempted new arguments on appeal (e.g., facts from an untimely proposed amended complaint) | Jim Beam relied on district-court rulings denying late filings; argued Slinker forfeited issues not raised below | Court held Slinker forfeited unpresented arguments and found no miscarriage-of-justice exception; affirmed lower court’s procedural ruling |
Key Cases Cited
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary judgment standard and burden at Rule 56)
- Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (§ 301 governs claims founded on rights created by CBAs and claims substantially dependent on CBA analysis)
- Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (state-law claims substantially dependent on CBA terms are preempted)
- Paul v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Ohio, 701 F.3d 514 (two-step § 301 preemption analysis)
- DeCoe v. General Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 212 (plaintiff cannot prove elements without contract interpretation; preemption)
- Rogers v. O’Donnell, 737 F.3d 1026 (standard of review for summary judgment)