Henry v. Wells Remodeling LLC, 2:16-cv-00511

Background

Henry was hired by Wells Remodeling (Alabama ReBath) as an installer in 2015 and initially paid $20/hour; he performed tasks at the company office (unloading demolition debris, loading materials), drove a company van to job sites, and returned the van to the office at day’s end.
Employer sometimes paid a fixed allotment for "load/unload time" (purportedly 45 minutes) and separately recorded travel/load pay on pay sheets; the actual time Henry spent on those tasks is not clearly recorded and Henry alleges he was undercompensated for approximately 42 hours pre-September 1, 2015.
On September 1, 2015 Henry was moved to commission pay; he conceded the commission period complied with FLSA (court previously granted summary judgment to defendants for Sept. 1–Oct. 26, 2015 claims).
Henry complained about pay and alleges (1) the employer stopped compensating load/unload time, (2) forced commission pay in retaliation, and (3) ultimately terminated him on October 26, 2015. Employer asserts nondiscriminatory performance and communication problems as lawful reasons for termination.
Procedurally, defendants moved for summary judgment on (A) unpaid wages/overtime for load/unload and travel time prior to Sept. 1, 2015, (B) noncompensable return travel under the Portal-to-Portal Act, and (C) FLSA retaliation; the court denies summary judgment as to unpaid wages/overtime for pre-Sept. 1 load/unload and travel-to-site claims, and grants summary judgment dismissing retaliation claims.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Were load/unload and travel-to-site hours prior to Sept. 1, 2015 compensable and properly paid under FLSA?	Henry says actual time unloading/loading and travel-to-site was unpaid or undercounted; he seeks unpaid minimum and overtime pay.	Defendants say pay sheets show Henry was paid (45-minute allotment per phase) and thus no unpaid wages are due.	Denied for defendants: genuine disputes of material fact about actual hours, rates paid (varying amounts on pay sheets), and whether employer’s method complied with FLSA; summary judgment inappropriate.
Is return travel (van return to employer premises) noncompensable under the Portal-to-Portal Act?	Henry argues return travel was compensable because employer required/benefitted from returning the company van to the office and the van was integral to his work.	Defendants rely on Portal-to-Portal exclusion for ordinary home-to-work travel and contend such travel is noncompensable.	Denied for defendants: factual disputes (whether return to premises was required and whether the van was integral/indispensable) preclude summary judgment.
Was Henry’s transition to commission pay an adverse action for FLSA retaliation?	Henry contends the change reduced pay and was retaliatory after his complaints.	Defendants show commission-period pay equaled/exceeded his hourly rate in most weeks and argue the change was not adverse.	Held: Not adverse — evidence showed commission pay did not reduce his rate in most weeks; claim fails as to this action.
Was Henry’s termination retaliatory under the FLSA?	Henry contends termination followed protected complaints and thus was retaliatory.	Defendants assert legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons (poor communication, job quality, scheduling issues) and cite texts and testimony supporting those reasons.	Held for defendants: summary judgment granted—plaintiff failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact that employer’s stated reasons were pretext for retaliation.

Key Cases Cited

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary judgment standard)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (genuine dispute and reasonable jury standard at summary judgment)
Helmert v. Butterball, LLC, 805 F. Supp. 2d 655 (E.D. Ark.) (employer cannot rely on estimated time if actual time makes pay fall below FLSA requirements)
IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21 (definition of integral and indispensable under FLSA)
Integrity Staffing Solutions, Inc. v. Busk, 568 U.S. 442 (test for integral and indispensable activities under FLSA)
Llorca v. Sheriff, Collier Cty., Florida, 893 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir.) (commuting and preliminary/postliminary activities compensable only if integral and indispensable)
Meeks v. Pasco Cty. Sheriff, [citation="688 F. App'x 714"] (11th Cir.) (travel time to/from employer premises compensable where vehicle was essential to job)