42 A.3d 96
Md. Ct. Spec. App.2012Background
- Henry was charged with multiple sexual offense and related offenses in Prince George's County.
- At suppression, it was undisputed Henry invoked his right to counsel while in custody prior to any statements.
- Hearing showed an audiotaped exchange where Henry initially asked for a lawyer and indicated he would not talk without counsel.
- After a bathroom trip during which he again expressed a desire to speak, Henry gave a written and oral statement later admitted at suppression and trial.
- The trial court partially suppressed statements and photographs, but allowed statements after the bathroom trip, finding valid waiver and lack of interrogation.
- The Court of Special Appeals reversed the denial of suppression, vacated the judgment for the speedy-trial ruling, and remanded for suppression, while upholding the speedy-trial ruling.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Edwards presumption requires suppression of statements after invoking counsel | Henry argues Edwards presumes involuntariness after invoke; state Bears burden without rebuttal | State contends appellant initiated after bathroom trip, waiving Edwards presumption | Suppression required; Edwards presumption not rebutted by State |
| Whether the evidence showed the statements after the bathroom trip were initiated by Henry | Appellant testified Taylor coerced during hallway and bathroom segment | State contends Bingley showed initiation by Henry after asking to tell his side | State failed to rebut Edwards presumption; statements suppressed |
| Whether the trial court correctly applied Streams and Gill to voluntariness evidence | Streams/Gill require rebuttal when coercive tactics are claimed | State argues those lines not preserved or applicable to Edwards setting | Streams/Gill apply; State failed to rebut voluntariness |
| Whether the error in admitting suppressed statements was harmless | Inculpatory written/oral statements were highly prejudicial | Weighs the record to assess harmlessness | Not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; judgment vacated and remanded for suppression |
| Whether the delay in prosecution violated the speedy-trial rights | Delay attributable to State impaired rights | Delay largely neutral; DNA backlog and defense demand justified postponements | Speedy-trial rights not violated |
Key Cases Cited
- Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (U.S. 1981) ( Edwards presumes involuntariness after counsel invocation; interrogation must cease)
- Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (U.S. 2010) (Edwards presumption and subsequent waiver analyzed post-custody break)
- Blake v. State, 381 Md. 218 (Md. 2004) (initiation requirement after invoking right to counsel; waiver must be initiated by suspect)
- Streams v. State, 238 Md. 278 (Md. 1965) (State must rebut voluntariness with contrary evidence when coercion is claimed)
- Gill v. State, 265 Md. 350 (Md. 1972) (police coercion claims require rebuttal by state; voluntariness evidence key)
- Winder v. State, 362 Md. 275 (Md. 2001) (burden on state to prove voluntariness of confession)
- Kanneh v. State, 403 Md. 678 (Md. 2008) ( Barker balancing factors for speedy-trial analysis under Md. law)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. 1972) (balancing test for speedy-trial rights: length, reason, assertion, prejudice)