Henry v. Jones
202 So. 3d 129
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2016Background
- Plaintiff George Henry sued his sister Margaret Jones for tortious interference with his expectancy of inheritance, obtaining a $100,000 jury verdict.
- Henry alleged Jones, as caregiver to their mother from 2006–2009, improperly diverted funds from a GNMA (Ginnie Mae) account that the mother transferred into a joint checking account. Henry identified 108 checks totaling $119,580.08 as improper diversions.
- Jones denied undue influence, testifying the mother authorized and effectuated the transfers. Henry admitted he did not know who made the transfers.
- Henry relied on a forensic psychologist (Dr. Randy Otto), who reviewed records and opined the mother had Alzheimer’s-type dementia and was vulnerable to undue influence by late 2008 (possibly as early as March 2007). Otto never examined the mother in person.
- A single home-visit social worker (Dorothea Swee-Sykes) testified she found the mother asleep in March 2007, asked her name, and expressed concern about caregiver burden for Jones; she did not report problems with the mother’s care or document specific acts of undue influence.
- The trial court granted Jones’s motion for a new trial based on (1) the verdict being contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and (2) an alleged improper quotient verdict; the appellate court affirms on the manifest-weight ground but reverses the quotient-verdict basis.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the jury rendered an improper quotient verdict | Jurors used the averaging/quotient process and agreed to be bound by it (jury question allegedly shows pre-commitment) | Jury question alone does not prove binding agreement or averaging process; no juror testimony showed agreement to be bound | Reversed as to quotient-verdict claim — trial court abused discretion; record insufficient to show improper quotient verdict |
| Whether verdict was against manifest weight of the evidence | Henry argued Jones exercised undue influence over a cognitively impaired mother and diverted funds, warranting $100,000 verdict | Jones argued the mother made transfers herself; expert never met mother; no testimony of coercive acts; some transfers predated loss of capacity | Affirmed — appellate court agrees the verdict was contrary to manifest weight and new trial on that basis was proper |
| Sufficiency of undue-influence proof | Henry relied on expert records review and living situation to show vulnerability to influence | Jones emphasized lack of direct evidence of over-persuasion, coercion, or fraudulent contrivance and that transfers were effectuated by the mother | Held for Jones on sufficiency: evidence did not establish undue influence by clear weight; supports new trial |
| Role of expert records-only opinion in proving capacity/undue influence | Expert asserted dementia and vulnerability based on records review | Court notes limitations of records-only opinion and lack of corroborating testimony of coercive acts | Court found expert opinion insufficient, contributing to conclusion verdict was against manifest weight |
Key Cases Cited
- Moore v. Gillett, 96 So. 3d 933 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (abuse-of-discretion standard for new-trial rulings)
- Albertsons, Inc. v. Johnson, 442 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (definition of impermissible quotient verdict)
- Cromarty v. Ford Motor Co., 341 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 1976) (moving party must prove jurors agreed to be bound by quotient before computing verdict)
- Greens to You, Inc. v. Gavelek, 967 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (quotient-verdict reversal requires clear and convincing evidence; juror testimony often necessary)
- Whalen v. Prosser, 719 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (elements of intentional interference with an expectancy of inheritance)
- Estate of Kester v. Rocco, 117 So. 3d 1196 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013) (definition of undue influence as destruction of free agency and willpower)