Henry Hodges v. Stanton Heidle, Warden, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 17026

Hodges was convicted of premeditated first-degree murder and sentenced to death in 1992 in Tennessee.
The conviction and sentence were upheld on direct appeal and in state post-conviction proceedings; federal habeas petition was denied.
Facts show Hodges and his girlfriend Trina Brown murdered Ronald Bassett in Nashville, robbed the scene, and used Bassett’s ATM card to withdraw funds; Hodges was connected by fingerprints and Brown’s testimony.
Mitigation evidence proposed a background of childhood dysfunction, alleged sexual abuse at age 12, antisocial traits, and substance abuse; the State presented contrary psychiatric testimony.
The jury found three aggravating factors: prior violent felonies, heinous/cruel conduct, and commission of a murder during a robbery; the death sentence followed after balancing aggravators and mitigators.
The issues on habeas review included voir dire restrictions, juror-misconduct claims, ineffective assistance at plea, and competency/ineffective assistance at sentencing; several claims were procedurally defaulted.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Voir dire restrictions on specific aggravating factors	Hodges contends voir dire prevented uncovering juror bias.	State courts allowed Morgan-based querying and limited only the most case-specific questions.	No reversible error; restrictions were not contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law.
Juror misconduct claim and procedural default	Thompson’s alleged misconduct affected the integrity of the death sentence.	No state-court briefing on this exact theory; default cannot be cured.	Procedurally defaulted; no sufficient cause shown to excuse default.
Ineffective assistance at plead" phase	Counsel advised pleading guilty due to misapprehensions about penalties; prejudice shown.	Advice was reasonable under Strickland’s deferential standard given overwhelming guilt.	State court reasonable; no plain error under AEDPA; no prejudice shown.
Ineffective assistance at sentencing & trial competency	Counsel failed to thoroughly investigate mitigating evidence; Hodges was incompetent at trial.	Counsel’s performance was reasonable; mitigation strategy supported by record.	Evidentiary hearing denied; trial/counsel performance not deficient under Strickland; no relief.

Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (U.S. 1992) (voir dire identity of biased jurors essential to fairness)
Dennis v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 511 (6th Cir. 2003) (limits on juror-questioning do not impermissibly bar Morgan-type previews)
Bedford v. Collins, 567 F.3d 225 (6th Cir. 2009) (limits on voir dire to prevent previewing specific case facts)
Richmond v. Polk, 375 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 2004) (Morgan does not require case-specific voir dire; adequacy evaluated by biases avoidance)
United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 1998) (precommitment questions overstep Morgan’s scope)
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (U.S. 1985) (prejudice inquiry in guilty-plea context hinges on probability of trial success)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (establishes two-prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (U.S. 2011) (AEDPA deference emphasizes reasonableness of Strickland applied to state court")
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (U.S. 2012) (narrow exception to Coleman for ineffective-assistance in initial-review collateral proceedings)
Post v. Bradshaw, 621 F.3d 406 (6th Cir. 2010) (mitigation investigation standards; distinguishable from present case)
Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (U.S. 2004) (guilty-plea strategy in capital cases; not a guaranteed benefit)
Nixon (cited in text), 543 U.S. 175 (U.S. 2004) (plea strategy and evidence presentation during sentencing phase)