Henry Hodges v. Roland Colson, 711 F.3d 589

Hodges was convicted of premeditated first‑degree murder in 1992 and sentenced to death, with Tennessee courts affirming.
State post‑conviction relief was denied; Hodges’ federal habeas petition was denied and affirmed by the Sixth Circuit.
Facts center on Hodges and his 15‑year‑old girlfriend Brown aiding the murder of Ronald Bassett in Nashville; Hodges killed Bassett while Brown assisted and later withdrew funds using Bassett’s ATM card.
Jury found three aggravating circumstances: prior violent felonies, heinous/cruel murder, and commission/attempted robbery; the aggravating factors outweighed mitigators beyond a reasonable doubt.
Mitigation included Hodges’ background (dysfunctional family, abuse history), juvenile conduct, antisocial personality disorder, substance abuse, and expert testimony; defense argued this supported a lesser sentence.
The issues on appeal included voir dire restrictions, juror misconduct, ineffective assistance of trial counsel at plea, and ineffective assistance at sentencing/incompetency; Hodges waived several claims by failing to brief them fully.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Voir dire restrictions on specific sentencing questions	Hodges argues the court prevented identifying biased jurors who would always vote death.		State courts reasonably applied Morgan; voir dire restrictions were not unconstitutional.
Juror misconduct and procedural default	Thompson’s alleged misconduct and default should be excused by cause.	No adequate state‑court remedies remained; Martinez exception does not apply to appellate‑counsel default here.	Procedural default upheld; Martinez does not excuse the default; no habeas relief on this claim.
Ineffective assistance of trial counsel at the plea phase	Counsel misadvised Hodges to plead guilty, preventing adequate mitigation and leading to an involuntary plea.	Counsel’s strategy was reasonable under Strickland given overwhelming guilt and aims to gain mitigation credibility.	No AEDPA/Strickland error; trial counsel’s performance not deficient and no prejudice shown.
Ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing and trial incompetency	Counsel failed to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence; Hodges was incompetent at trial.		Substantive competency claim defaulted; sentencing mitigation investigation deemed reasonable; no relief granted on this claim.

Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992) (voir dire to identify biased jurors; cannot compel all such questions)
Dennis v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 511 (2003) (courts have discretion on voir dire; Morgan‑type previews not required)
Bedford v. Collins, 567 F.3d 225 (2009) (limits on voir dire to avoid previewing case facts; reasonable limits)
Richmond v. Polk, 375 F.3d 309 (2004) (Morgan does not require juror‑vote previews on specific aggravating factors)
United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir.1998) (Morgan‑type limits on juror questioning)
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (prejudice standard in guilty‑plea claims; Hill factors)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (dual prong standard for ineffective assistance)
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011) (doubly deferential review under § 2254(d) and Strickland)
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012) (narrow exception to Coleman for ineffective‑assistance claims in initial collateral proceedings)
Post v. Bradshaw, 621 F.3d 406 (2010) (distinguishes cases like Hodges on counsel’s actions in sentencing strategy)
Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004) (plea strategy in capital cases; not always beneficial)
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (ABA guidelines as guidance, not absolute rule)