Henley v. State, 2016 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 110

Background

Gregory Henley assaulted his ex‑wife (pulled her from a car by her hair, punched her, knocked her head on concrete) after a custodial dispute; he was convicted of misdemeanor family‑violence assault and sentenced to 200 days in jail.
Family court had ordered the children to live with Henley temporarily and to allow Brandy supervised weekend visitation (supervisor: Brandy’s parent); the visitation order barred contact with Brandy’s then‑fiancé, Douglas Gillingham, and his former stepson.
Months earlier CPS investigated allegations involving Douglas and his former stepson; some allegations were later found untrue and restrictions were lifted by the time of trial; there was no evidence Douglas or his former stepson were present or in contact with the children on the day of the assault.
Henley proffered evidence that he believed Brandy was an unfit parent, that she lied to the family court, and that prior alleged sexual abuse by Douglas’s former stepson made him fear imminent harm to his sons; the trial court excluded that evidence as irrelevant to a defense of a third person.
The court of appeals had allowed Henley to present the evidence; the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding the excluded evidence was not material or probative of a valid defense of a third person and its exclusion was not an abuse of discretion.

Issues

Issue	Henley’s Argument	State’s Argument	Held
Admissibility of evidence to support defense of a third person	Evidence that Brandy lied, prior abuse, and risk from Douglas made Henley reasonably believe force was needed to protect his sons	The proffered evidence related only to past incidents or speculative future harm and was not relevant to an immediate‑need justification	Excluded: evidence irrelevant because it did not show unlawful force was threatening the children immediately; exclusion not an abuse of discretion
Immediacy requirement for defense of a third person	Henley: his belief that intervention was immediately necessary was a jury question given the history of abuse and misrepresentations	State: no immediate or imminent threat existed; immediacy is required for justification defenses	Court: ‘‘immediately necessary’’ requires a split‑second need to prevent imminent harm; no immediate danger here, so defense not raised
Rule 403 balancing (prejudicial vs. probative)	Henley: evidence showed state of mind and reasonableness; probative value outweighed prejudice	State: evidence was inflammatory, confusing, and risked jury nullification; probative value minimal	Court: even if marginally relevant, probative value was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice/confusion; exclusion permissible under Rule 403
Confrontation Clause / right to cross‑examine	Henley: exclusion prevented confrontation and showing state of mind by cross‑examining Brandy about underlying incidents	State: cross‑examination limited because the matters were irrelevant or remote; trial court has discretion to limit collateral, confusing inquiry	Court: no Confrontation Clause violation; trial court properly limited cross‑examination because evidence was not probative of a valid defense and posed substantial risks

Key Cases Cited

Andersen v. United States, 170 U.S. 481 (1898) (precluding admission of prior provocation evidence where no reasonable ground for belief of imminent danger existed)
Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (standard for relevance and trial court’s discretion to admit evidence)
Fielder v. State, 756 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (battered‑spouse context: prior relationship evidence admissible to show state of mind under statutory provision)
De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (trial court evidentiary rulings will be upheld if correct on any applicable theory)
Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (factors for conducting a Rule 403 prejudice/probative balancing)