276 A.3d 484
D.C.2022Background
- Shortly after a 1:00 a.m. shooting, a 911 caller said a shooter had hidden a gun in the engine compartment of an older white Jaguar; police found the Jaguar unoccupied.
- Three uniformed officers were standing by the parked Jaguar when appellant Lorenzo Henderson walked up, stated the Jaguar was his, and the officers asked him to 'pop the hood.'
- Henderson reached into the car, released the hood latch; the hood did not rise automatically and he then walked away; officers chased him when he fled and escaped initially.
- Officer Lazarus manually lifted the hood after Henderson unlatched it and immediately saw a handgun in the engine compartment; Henderson was arrested days later.
- At the suppression hearing Henderson testified he was intoxicated, fearful of police because of past experiences, and understood the officer’s request only as releasing the latch; trial court found his consent to open the hood was voluntary and that lifting the hood was within the scope of that consent.
- The trial court denied the suppression motion; Henderson entered a conditional guilty plea to carrying a pistol without a license and appealed the denial.
Issues
| Issue | Henderson's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Henderson voluntarily consented to let police "pop the hood" | Consent involuntary due to post-shooting high police presence, intoxication, fear of police, and prior negative experiences | Consent was voluntary: Henderson approached officers, officers were noncoercive, he promptly complied with a conversational request | Affirmed: trial court’s factual finding of voluntary consent not clearly erroneous (totality of circumstances favors voluntariness) |
| Whether officers exceeded the scope of consent by lifting and looking under the hood | "Pop the hood" meant only unlatch the hood; lifting/looking required additional permission | Objective-reasonable interpretation: a request to 'pop the hood' includes opening it so officers can look; lifting was implicit in consent | Affirmed: objective standard shows a reasonable person would understand consent included opening/looking under the hood; discovery in plain view admissible; more intrusive searches would exceed consent |
Key Cases Cited
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (voluntariness required for consent searches under the Fourth Amendment)
- Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (scope of consent judged by objective reasonable-person standard)
- Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (deference to trial court factual findings)
- Basnueva v. United States, 874 A.2d 363 (D.C. 2005) (applying totality-of-circumstances test for consent)
- Brown v. United States, 983 A.2d 1023 (D.C. 2009) (scope and implied consent principles)
- Ware v. United States, 672 A.2d 557 (D.C. 1996) (consent and related Fourth Amendment analysis)