Henderson v. Auto Handling Corporation
3:11-cv-01118
S.D. Ill.Jan 11, 2012Background
- This case was removed from state court (Circuit Court of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit, St. Clair County, Illinois) to the Southern District of Illinois on December 21, 2011, and the court raised the issue sua sponte of federal subject matter jurisdiction.
- Plaintiff William Henderson, an employee of Jack Cooper Transport Company, Inc., allegedly sustained severe injuries on November 13, 2007 from a chain and ratchet tie-down system on a tractor-trailer designed and distributed by Cottrell, Inc.; his wife Angie Henderson asserts a derivative loss-of-consortium claim.
- Plaintiffs’ claims include strict products liability, negligence, and breach of warranty; the injury occurred in the context of equipment provided by Cooper Transport, not directly controlled by Cottrell.
- Cottrell argues the state-law claims are actually labor-contract (LMRA) claims under §301, because they relate to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between Henderson’s union and Cooper Transport; the CBA allegedly did not require Cottrell-provided equipment safety features.
- The court discusses the well-pleaded complaint rule and complete preemption, concluding the case is not completely preempted and must be remanded to state court; all pending motions are denied as moot; the order notes potential issues with successive removals.
- The court remanded the action to state court, holding lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
- IT IS SO ORDERED.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does LMRA §301 complete preemption apply to confer federal jurisdiction? | Henderson argues the claim is preempted by the CBA. | Cottrell contends the dispute relates to a CBA and is completely preempted. | Not completely preempted; remanded |
| Is federal jurisdiction proper under the well-pleaded complaint rule? | Plaintiffs allege state-law claims; federal question arises only via preemption. | Preemption would transform the claim into a federal-question case. | Not a federal-question case; remand |
Key Cases Cited
- Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (U.S. 1985) (complete preemption under §301 permits removal of state-law claims that are inextricably intertwined with CBA terms)
- Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (U.S. 1987) (well-pleaded complaint rule and federal jurisdiction limitations)
- Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1983) (limits removal and supports narrow construction of removal)
- Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (U.S. 1987) (complete preemption under ERISA context cited for federal-removal framework)
- Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (U.S. 1988) (federal-law uniform interpretation to resolve labor disputes under CBAs)
- Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (U.S. 1985) (see above)
- Nelson v. Stewart, 422 F.3d 463 (7th Cir. 2005) (describes complete preemption concept)
- Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G. (Zurich), 953 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1992) (removal and preemption principles in Seventh Circuit)
- Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995) (conflict preemption not basis for federal jurisdiction)
- Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (U.S. 1985) (complete preemption and CBA interpretation)
