Helm, Johnathan Lewis
PD-0796-15
| Tex. App. | Jun 29, 2015Background
- Appellant Jonathan Lewis Helm was indicted on multiple sexual-offense counts involving a juvenile; jury acquitted on Count One and convicted on Counts Two and Three, receiving consecutive sentences (20 and 10 years).
- The State originally realigned counts; the convictions on appeal correspond to Sexual Assault of a Child and Prohibited Sexual Conduct as tried.
- At trial the complainant testified she had sex with Helm once in Oklahoma and repeatedly denied any sexual activity in Tarrant County (Texas); the State nonetheless introduced a prior statement/letter and impeachment testimony suggesting sexual activity in Fort Worth/Tarrant County.
- The defense contends the only testimony establishing a Texas venue/sexual assault in Texas was admitted solely for impeachment and therefore cannot be used as substantive evidence of venue or guilt.
- The Court of Appeals (Fort Worth) affirmed the convictions, reasoning the defense failed to request a limiting instruction and that the complainant’s letter admitted without objection supported venue.
- Helm filed a Petition for Discretionary Review arguing insufficiency of the evidence (venue and substantive proof) because impeachment-only evidence was improperly used as substantive proof; he asks for reversal and acquittal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Helm) | Held (Court of Appeals / procedural posture) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether evidence sufficiently proved sexual assault occurred in Texas (venue) | Evidence (including a letter and impeachment testimony) supports venue; no limiting instruction requested | Only complainant’s trial testimony placed sexual activity in Oklahoma; impeachment evidence cannot be used substantively to prove venue or elements | Court of Appeals affirmed conviction, finding no error where defense did not request limiting instruction and letter was admitted without objection |
| Whether prior inconsistent statements admitted for impeachment may be considered substantive evidence | Prior statements and impeachment had probative value; jury could consider them given circumstances | Prior inconsistent statements admitted only for impeachment lack probative value and cannot sustain conviction absent hearsay exception | Appellate court treated impeachment evidence as properly before jury (no reversal); PDR argues controlling law bars substantive use |
| Whether trial court abused discretion under Rule 403 by admitting impeachment to place otherwise inadmissible evidence before jury | Admission was reasonable under circumstances; State had legitimate impeachment purpose | Admission was a pretext to place inadmissible substantive evidence before jury, violating Rule 403 and precedent | Appellate court found no reversible abuse because limiting instruction issue and other evidence (letter) cured error |
| Whether the conviction should be reversed and judgment of acquittal entered under Jackson v. Virginia | State met the Jackson sufficiency standard when impeachment and other evidence considered | Removing impeachment-only evidence leaves legally insufficient evidence to convict; Jackson acquittal warranted | Appellant’s PDR asks Court of Criminal Appeals to review; Court of Appeals had denied sufficiency challenge |
Key Cases Cited
- Key v. State, 492 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (prior inconsistent statements admitted only for impeachment cannot be used as substantive proof)
- Williams v. State, 565 S.W.2d 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (same principle limiting impeachment use)
- Cherb v. State, 472 S.W.2d 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (longstanding rule that impeachment-only statements lack probative value as substantive evidence)
- Wall v. State, 417 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967) (impeachment evidence cannot substitute for substantive proof)
- Shivers v. State, 374 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964) (same)
- Hughes v. State, 4 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (trial court must guard against use of impeachment evidence primarily to place otherwise inadmissible evidence before jury under Rule 403)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (standard for sufficiency of evidence review)
