Heller v. City of Dallas
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159240
N.D. Tex.2014Background
- Plaintiffs served two sets of RFPs and one set of interrogatories on the City of Dallas; some City responses were served seven days late and contained broad objections and "subject to and without waiving" answers.
- Plaintiffs moved to compel and for sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g); the Court held a lengthy July 17, 2014 hearing, granted many of Plaintiffs’ compel requests on the record, and deferred ruling on sanctions.
- The Court ordered supplemental answers to Interrogatory No. 1 (identify persons who provided information) and Interrogatory No. 14; the City later supplemented but Plaintiffs sought sanctions for earlier inadequacies and boilerplate objections.
- The City defended its conduct as good-faith advocacy and noted substantial productions and conferences with Plaintiffs’ counsel; Plaintiffs argued the City’s objections were boilerplate, vague, overbroad, unduly burdensome, and thus violative of Rule 26(g).
- The magistrate judge found multiple Rule 26(g)(1) violations (notably Interrogatory No.1 and many objections to Plaintiffs’ First Set of RFPs), imposed sanctions under Rule 26(g)(3) limited to attorneys’ fees for specified discovery work, and ordered City counsel to review the opinion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule 26(g)(3) sanctions are required for certification violations generally | City made boilerplate, vague, overbroad, and "subject to" objections without reasonable inquiry; fees are mandatory if no substantial justification | City argued its objections were reasonable, made in good faith, and many disputes were complex or resolved at hearing | Grant in part: sanctions imposed where counsel’s certifications lacked reasonable inquiry and were not substantially justified; not imposed where objections were substantially justified or resolved earlier |
| Interrogatory No. 1 (identify persons who provided information) | City failed to identify individuals as ordered and initially gave an incomplete, protective answer; certification violated Rule 26(g) | City claimed privilege/expert concerns and later said verifications and supplements cured the issue | Held sanctionable under Rule 26(g): initial answer and objections violated Rule 26(g)(1) without substantial justification; Court ordered supplementation and included fees tied to securing full answer |
| Use of boilerplate/general objections and incorporation into every response | Such generic "General Objections" prevent knowing what was withheld and violate Rules 33/34; Rule 26(g) violation | City used general objections but did not rely on them at hearing and argued privileges were asserted appropriately | Court found general objections improper but declined to impose sanctions under Rule 26(g)(3) for those general objections in these circumstances (warning given) |
| Overbreadth/undue burden and vague/ambiguous objections to many RFPs | City raised these objections to almost every request without specific facts or affidavits to substantiate burden or vagueness | City argued it explained burdens in writing and conferences and preserved positions on complex discovery | Court found majority of these objections (especially to Plaintiffs’ First Set of RFPs) were boilerplate and unjustified; imposed Rule 26(g)(3) sanctions (attorneys’ fees) except where City had shown particularized burden (RFPs 6,7,8) |
| Responding "subject to and without waiving" objections | Plaintiffs argued this practice is confusing and inconsistent with Rules and reflects reflexive objections | City used the formulation commonly; urged it was not sanctionable here | Court criticized the practice as inconsistent with Rules, but because of sparse circuit authority and Plaintiffs not pressing it as sanctionable, declined to impose Rule 26(g) sanctions on that ground (warning issued) |
Key Cases Cited
- McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles, 894 F.2d 1482 (5th Cir. 1990) (criticizes reflexive/boilerplate objections and commends professional civility in discovery)
- Chapman & Cole v. Itel Container Int’l B.V., 865 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1989) (reasonableness of counsel’s inquiry under Rule 26(g) is fact-dependent)
- Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 960 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1992) (attorney must make reasonable inquiry before opposing discovery)
- Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (U.S. 1988) (defines "substantially justified" as reasonable to satisfy a reasonable person)
- Sheets v. Yamaha Motors Corp., U.S.A., 891 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1990) (certification speaks as of the time it is made; avoid hindsight in Rule 26(g) review)
- In re Santa Fe Int’l Corp., 272 F.3d 705 (5th Cir. 2001) (party asserting privilege bears the burden to demonstrate applicability)
- Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (U.S. 1991) (district court discretion in selecting sanctions)
- Tollett v. City of Kemah, 285 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. 2002) (lodestar method for fee awards)