168 Conn. App. 467
Conn. App. Ct.2016Background
- Francis A. Bartlett’s 1950 will created a trust funded by family company stock; income was to be paid to his wife for life, then in equal shares to his two children, Robert and Jane, for life, with each child’s half thereafter payable to that child’s children.
- When Jane died in 1991, her half of trust income was divided equally between her two children, Frank Heisinger and Ann Dillon (25% each of total trust income).
- Frank died (2007/2008); trustees began paying his 25% income share to Dillon. Cody Heisinger (Frank’s son) sued, claiming he should receive his deceased father’s income share as Frank’s sole heir.
- Cody filed a declaratory judgment action and a probate appeal challenging an interim accounting that included payments to Dillon; all parties moved for summary judgment.
- Trial court concluded the will’s plain language showed Francis intended income to go to his children (and grandchildren who were lives in being at his death) until the last surviving child in being at his death died, so Dillon is entitled to Frank’s former income share for her lifetime; summary judgment for defendants was entered and affirmed on appeal; probate appeal dismissed as moot.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Who is entitled to Frank’s income share after his death? | Heisinger: trust income should pass to Frank’s sole heir (him) after Frank’s death. | Dillon/trustees: will gives income to Jane’s children who were lives in being at Francis’s death; surviving child (Dillon) gets the income until her death. | Court: Held for defendants — will’s language entitles Dillon to Frank’s share for her lifetime. |
| Does the will manifest intent to benefit great-grandchildren with income? | Heisinger: will does not expressly address distribution; default rules should favor descendants (per modern Restatement provisions). | Defendants: will focuses income on wife, children, grandchildren (who were lives in being); great-grandchildren get only principal per stirpes on termination. | Court: Will shows intent to limit income to wife, children, grandchildren in being at testator’s death; great‑grandchildren not entitled to income. |
| Which default construction rules govern (Restatement Second vs Third)? | Heisinger: rely on Restatement (Third) of Trusts (later authority) to imply income to descendants of deceased income beneficiary. | Defendants: use Restatement (Second) (contemporaneous to 1950 will) and older authority; testator cannot be presumed to follow later-restatement rules. | Court: Where resorting to defaults, use rules existing when will drafted (Restatement Second); those support defendants’ view. |
| Is the probate appeal justiciable or moot? | Heisinger: Probate Court lacked jurisdiction/its accounting should be held in abeyance pending declaratory judgment. | Defendants: declaratory judgment resolving entitlement resolves probate accounting; no jurisdictional defect that changes result. | Court: Declaratory ruling disposes of substantive dispute; probate appeal rendered moot and dismissed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Stanley v. Stanley, 108 Conn. 100 (1928) (interpreting testamentary language in context of beneficiaries’ entitlements)
- Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. v. Gowdy, 141 Conn. 546 (1954) (case construing specific testamentary provisions; not a general rule overriding testator intent)
- Gimbel v. Bernard F. & Alva B. Gimbel Foundation, Inc., 166 Conn. 21 (1974) (testator’s expressed intent controls construction of testamentary trusts)
- Hartford National Bank & Trust Co. v. Birge, 159 Conn. 35 (1970) (attorneys presumed familiar with rules of construction existing when will drafted; precedents limited when language differs)