Heike v. Central Michigan University Board of Trustees, 573 F. App'x 476

Brooke Heike was a CMU basketball player whose scholarship was revoked after her sophomore season; she appealed administratively and the revocation was upheld.
In 2009 Heike filed a § 1983 suit against CMU and several CMU officials alleging Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection and due-process violations; the district court dismissed CMU on Eleventh Amendment grounds and later granted summary judgment to the remaining individual defendants in their individual and official capacities, then dismissed the case.
While the first suit was pending (after CMU was dismissed), Heike filed a second suit against CMU alleging Title VI and Title IX violations and Fourteenth Amendment claims.
CMU moved for judgment on the pleadings arguing claim and issue preclusion; the district court granted the motion and dismissed Heike’s second suit with prejudice on claim-preclusion grounds.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding (1) a final judgment on the merits existed (the May 3, 2010 summary-judgment order); (2) CMU was in privity with officials sued in their official capacities; (3) Heike’s Title VI and Title IX claims should have been litigated in the first action because they arise from the same transaction; and (4) there is identity of claims because both suits rest on the same operative facts.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether there was a final adjudication on the merits in the first action	Heike: dismissal of CMU was jurisdictional (so not a preclusive merits ruling)	CMU: May 3, 2010 summary-judgment order is a final merits adjudication	Held: Final adjudication existed (May 3, 2010 summary judgment)
Whether CMU is bound by the prior judgment (privity)	Heike: officials and CMU are not in privity because prior dismissals were jurisdictional	CMU: officials sued in official capacities are in privity with the university	Held: Officials in official capacities are privies; CMU is bound
Whether Title VI and Title IX claims were or should have been litigated in the first action	Heike: claims are distinct and could be brought later; she was not prevented from litigating	CMU: claims arise from same transaction and should have been raised in first suit	Held: Heike should have raised those claims in the initial suit; claim preclusion bars them
Whether identity of claims exists despite differing statutory elements	Heike: differing statutory elements and remedies mean different claims	CMU: both suits share the same operative facts and evidence	Held: Identity exists—claims are based on substantially same operative facts

Westwood Chem. Co., Inc. v. Kulick, 656 F.2d 1224 (6th Cir. 1981) (purpose of claim preclusion and its elements)
Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470 (U.S. 1998) (final judgment on the merits bars relitigation of claims that were or could have been raised)
Rawe v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 462 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2006) (claims arising from same transaction must be brought in initial suit)
United States v. Tohono O'Odham Nation, 131 S. Ct. 1723 (U.S. 2011) (test for identity of claim depends on factual overlap and operative facts)
Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246 (U.S. 2009) (Title VI and Title IX claims can be brought alongside § 1983 claims)
Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (U.S. 1981) (preclusive effect binds parties and their privies)
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (U.S. 1985) (official-capacity suits are treated as suits against the entity)
Ohio Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 F.2d 320 (6th Cir. 1990) (summary judgment is a final adjudication on the merits)
Sanders Confectionery Prods., Inc. v. Heller Fin. Inc., 973 F.2d 474 (6th Cir. 1992) (elements and scope of claim and issue preclusion)