Hedlund v. Ryan
854 F.3d 557
| 9th Cir. | 2016Background
- Charles Michael Hedlund was convicted of first‑degree murder (Jim McClain) and second‑degree murder (Christene Mertens) after a joint trial with co‑defendant McKinney; Hedlund received the death penalty for McClain’s murder.
- At trial Hedlund and McKinney were tried before dual juries; both defendants were ordered to wear leg braces for courtroom security; a juror disclosed a distant relation to a victim and was retained after an in‑chambers hearing.
- Hedlund rejected a plea sequence (or counsel sought judge recusal before presenting a later plea); the trial judge declined to accept the prior plea and trial proceeded.
- Penalty phase mitigation included expert testimony about Hedlund’s childhood abuse, alcoholism, neuropsychological deficits, and possible brain damage; sentencing court found the mitigation credible but concluded it did not affect Hedlund’s capacity at the time of the crime.
- On direct appeal Arizona’s Supreme Court affirmed convictions and independently reviewed and reweighed aggravating/mitigating evidence; on federal habeas the Ninth Circuit majority affirmed most claims but found Arizona applied an unconstitutional “causal nexus” test to nonstatutory mitigation and remanded to grant relief as to sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Visible leg brace (shackling) | Leg brace was visible and prejudicial; violated due process | Leg brace justified by specific courtroom security needs and minimally intrusive; trial court mitigated visibility | Denied: restraint justified by essential state interest; no AEDPA error in state court’s factual findings |
| Use of dual juries | Dual juries prejudiced Hedlund and impaired rights (leading questions, antagonistic defenses) | Dual juries were a permissible case‑management tool with safeguards; no controlling Supreme Court rule forbidding them | Denied: no clearly established federal law against dual juries; no showing of specific prejudice |
| Juror bias (distant relation) | Juror’s distant relation to victim required removal or presumption of bias | Trial court held a Remmer/Smith hearing; juror affirmed impartiality and was credible | Denied: actual bias not shown; implied‑bias doctrine not clearly established; state court hearing adequate |
| Ineffective assistance during plea process | Counsel’s tactical move to seek recusal (instead of presenting plea) was deficient and prejudiced Hedlund’s chance to avoid death | Counsel’s recusal motion was a reasonable tactical decision; trial judge likely would not have accepted plea anyway | Denied: state PCR reasonably applied Strickland; no reasonable probability plea would have been accepted |
| Ineffective assistance during penalty phase | Counsel failed to develop/present full neuropsychological mitigation (brain damage) | Counsel retained experts, presented childhood, alcohol, and neuropsych evidence; later experts did not materially differ | Denied: PCR court’s findings reasonable; counsel’s performance within wide professional range |
| Consideration of mitigating evidence (Lockett/Eddings causal‑nexus) | Arizona applied a causal‑nexus rule excluding nonstatutory mitigation unless tied to the crime, violating Lockett/Eddings | State relied on trial court’s findings and argued mitigation was considered and given weight | Granted as to sentence: Ninth Circuit (following en banc McKinney) held Arizona applied unconstitutional causal‑nexus test; error was not harmless and requires vacatur or resentencing |
Key Cases Cited
- Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (sentencer may consider any aspect of defendant’s character or record as mitigation)
- Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (sentencer may not refuse to consider relevant mitigating evidence as a matter of law)
- McKinney v. Ryan, 813 F.3d 798 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (Arizona Supreme Court’s causal‑nexus practice violates Eddings; applied here)
- Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986) (restraints or similar practices permitted only when justified by an essential state interest)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (Strickland standard applied to plea decisions)
- Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982) (hearing with parties present is the proper remedy for juror partiality)
- Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534 (1993) (severance and joint‑trial prejudice standard)