120 F.4th 722
11th Cir.2024Background
- Hector Diaz-Arellano, a Mexican national, entered the U.S. without authorization in 1989 and was deemed removable in 2017.
- Diaz-Arellano applied for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), arguing his removal would cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his U.S.-citizen daughter, who was under 21 at the time of filing.
- The statute defines “child” as an unmarried person under twenty-one, and Diaz-Arellano's daughter turned 21 before his final removal hearing.
- The immigration judge and later the Board of Immigration Appeals denied relief, holding he was ineligible because his daughter had aged out at the time of adjudication.
- Diaz-Arellano argued the relevant date should be when the application was filed, not adjudicated; the Board disagreed, citing precedent (Matter of Isidro-Zamorano).
- The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the Board's decision after the Supreme Court’s overruling of Chevron deference and denied Diaz-Arellano’s petition for review.
Issues
| Issue | Diaz-Arellano's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether eligibility for cancellation of removal under §1229b(b)(1) depends on a child’s age at application or at adjudication | Age should be assessed at filing; his daughter was under 21 then | Age is determined at time of final adjudication/removal | Age at adjudication; no qualifying child, ineligible |
| Whether agency delay or case timing justifies an exception if a child ages out before adjudication | Proceedings' timing is often outside applicant's control, so exception is needed | Delays were largely applicant's own decisions; statute is unambiguous | No exception permitted; no undue or unfair delay shown |
| Validity of Matter of Isidro-Zamorano’s interpretation absent Chevron deference post-Loper Bright | Board’s reading of the statute is not controlling without deference; statute is ambiguous | Interpretation is correct even without deference; text is clear | Statute unambiguously supports Board’s reading |
| Whether the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA) applies to cancellation of removal age calculations | Statutory silence supports age freezing like CSPA | CSPA doesn’t amend cancellation provision; Congress knows how to freeze age | CSPA inapplicable to cancellation provision |
Key Cases Cited
- Matter of Isidro-Zamorano, 25 I. & N. Dec. 829 (B.I.A. 2012) (child must be under 21 at time of adjudication for cancellation eligibility)
- Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41 (2014) (age is fixed at the time of filing in certain applications under CSPA, but not for cancellation of removal)
- Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169 (2014) (interpret statutes with reference to text, context, history, purpose)
- Jeune v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 810 F.3d 792 (11th Cir. 2016) (review limited to BIA's decision unless IJ’s opinion expressly adopted)
- Poveda v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 692 F.3d 1168 (11th Cir. 2012) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)