Hecksher v. Fairwinds Baptist Church, Inc.
115 A.3d 1187
| Del. | 2015Background
- Plaintiff Kimberly Hecksher alleges long-term sexual abuse by her foster father and Fairwinds teacher, Ed Sterling, beginning when she was 13; Sterling invoked the Fifth Amendment at deposition and adverse inferences were drawn.
- Hecksher lived with Sterling’s family and attended Fairwinds Christian School (small, <30 employees); Sterling’s wife Sandy was the school secretary and sister-in-law also worked as a teacher.
- Hecksher claims Sandy observed abuse (on at least one school occasion and at home) and failed to report it; other students/parents made separate complaints about Sterling’s inappropriate conduct.
- Fairwinds had no written sexual-abuse prevention/reporting policy and provided no formal training; Delaware law required reporting of suspected child abuse.
- Hecksher sued under the Child Victim’s Act, which allows time-barred childhood sexual-abuse claims and permits entity liability only for gross negligence; Superior Court granted summary judgment for Fairwinds.
- Delaware Supreme Court reversed: held triable issues exist whether Sandy’s knowledge/failure-to-report can be imputed to Fairwinds (imputation and respondeat superior) and whether Fairwinds was grossly negligent by lacking policies and not responding to red flags.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Sandy’s knowledge of abuse can be imputed to Fairwinds | Sandy learned of abuse while acting as school employee; her knowledge ‘pertains to duties’ and she had authority to act, so impute to employer | Sandy acted solely for personal loyalty to husband (adverse interest); thus outside scope of employment and not imputable | Reversed — factual dispute exists; jury could find Sandy was within scope and adverse-interest exception is narrow so imputation may apply |
| Whether Fairwinds is vicariously liable for Sandy’s failure to report | Sandy’s failure to report was tortious conduct committed within scope of employment or at least partially to serve employer (dual-purpose); thus vicarious liability possible | Vicarious liability inappropriate because Sandy acted solely for personal reasons; imposing respondeat superior would circumvent Act’s gross negligence requirement | Reversed — jury could find motive partially served employer (foreseeability from nepotistic hires); vicarious liability triable issue |
| Whether Fairwinds was grossly negligent in supervision (policy/training) | Failure to adopt any sexual-abuse prevention/reporting policy or training was an extreme departure from care given statutory reporting duty and small school context | No statutory duty to create policy; absence of policy alone plus isolated complaints is insufficient to show gross negligence | Reversed — triable issues exist: lack of policies and training plus staff conflicts and red flags could constitute gross negligence |
| Whether school’s response to red flags (student/parent complaints, reputation, public incidents) amounted to gross negligence | Multiple incidents, counseling only, student withdrawals, public inappropriate acts — a reasonable jury could find deliberate indifference amounting to gross negligence | Complaints were isolated, unrelated, and handled (counseling); nothing shows administration had actual knowledge of abuse of Hecksher to warrant gross negligence | Reversed — jury must decide credibility and whether cumulative red flags establish gross negligence |
Key Cases Cited
- Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (U.S. 1976) (Fifth Amendment adverse inference in civil context)
- Jardel Co., Inc. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518 (Del. 1987) (scope of employment and employer liability principles)
- Doe v. State, 76 A.3d 774 (Del. 2013) (discussion of imputation and adverse-interest exception)
- Brown v. United Water Delaware, Inc., 3 A.3d 272 (Del. 2010) (summary judgment standard)
- Furek v. Univ. of Delaware, 594 A.2d 506 (Del. 1991) (special relationship/duty to regulate and supervise in educational context)