80 F.4th 717
5th Cir.2023Background
- Hebrew, a devout member of the Hebrew Nation who took a Nazarite vow to keep long hair and a beard, was hired as a TDCJ correctional officer trainee in August 2019.
- TDCJ’s grooming policy prohibited beards (except for medical exceptions) and prohibited long hair for male officers; female officers were allowed long hair; TDCJ later amended its policy to permit quarter-inch beards for male officers.
- At the training academy, Hebrew refused to cut his hair or shave his beard for religious reasons, was photographed, placed on unpaid leave, and submitted two religious accommodation requests which TDCJ denied citing safety and contraband concerns.
- TDCJ terminated Hebrew after he maintained his Nazarite vow; Hebrew exhausted administrative remedies and sued under Title VII alleging religious discrimination and failure to accommodate.
- The district court granted summary judgment for TDCJ, finding TDCJ had a legitimate safety reason and that accommodation would impose undue hardship (coworker burden); Hebrew appealed.
- The Fifth Circuit reversed, applying the Supreme Court’s recent Groff v. DeJoy undue-hardship standard and finding TDCJ failed to meet its burden and also discriminated based on religion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether TDCJ failed to reasonably accommodate Hebrew’s religious practice under Title VII | Hebrew sought accommodation to keep long hair/beard as a religious vow; TDCJ denied and did not show undue hardship | TDCJ argued accommodation would cause safety/contraband risks and extra coworker work, exceeding de minimis burden | Court: TDCJ failed to show "undue hardship" under Groff (must show substantial increased costs/strain); summary judgment for TDCJ reversed on accommodation claim |
| Whether terminating Hebrew because of his religious practice (failure-to-accommodate motive) violated Title VII (disparate treatment) | Hebrew argued TDCJ fired him to avoid accommodating his religious practice; his request and notice were known | TDCJ relied on an otherwise-neutral grooming policy and asserted safety/security justification | Court: Employer’s desire to avoid accommodation is a prohibited motivating factor; TDCJ’s neutral policy does not excuse discharge—Title VII protects religious practices and requires favored treatment; discrimination holding in Hebrew’s favor |
| Proper standard for "undue hardship" on remand | Groff requires substantial burden test, not de minimis | TDCJ relied on the old de minimis framing and generalized safety concerns | Court: Apply Groff’s substantial-in-context test; consider employer size, operating costs, particular accommodation, and alternative accommodations; impacts on coworkers are insufficient unless they substantially strain the business |
Key Cases Cited
- Groff v. DeJoy, 143 S. Ct. 2279 (2023) (redefined Title VII "undue hardship" to require substantial increased costs/strain, rejecting the de minimis test)
- Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (historically read to permit de minimis burden standard but limited by Groff)
- Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. EEOC, 575 U.S. 768 (2015) (employers may not treat religious practices worse than other practices; motive to avoid accommodation violates Title VII)
- Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015) (recognized searches as a means to address beard-based safety concerns in corrections settings)
- Nobach v. Woodland Village Nursing Center, Inc., 799 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 2015) (motivating-factor standard in failure-to-accommodate discrimination claims)
- Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 721 F.3d 444 (7th Cir. 2013) (employer bears burden to show that all possible accommodations would impose undue hardship)
- Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359 (3d Cir. 1999) (exceptions to a grooming policy can undermine asserted safety rationale)