710 S.W.3d 686
Tenn.2025Background
- Heather Smith, an at-will employee of BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee (a private employer), was required to adhere to a COVID-19 vaccine mandate.
- Smith sought a religious accommodation to avoid the mandate and, after denial, sent emails to Tennessee legislators expressing her opposition.
- BlueCross informed Smith her emails violated company social media policy; she sent a second email after being warned.
- Smith was terminated, allegedly for violating policy related to her legislative communications.
- Smith sued for retaliatory discharge, arguing her firing violated public policy, specifically the right to petition in Article I, Section 23 of the Tennessee Constitution.
- The trial court dismissed the case; the Court of Appeals reversed; the Tennessee Supreme Court granted review and reversed the appellate decision, affirming dismissal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the TN constitutional right to petition apply to private employers? | Article I, Section 23 protects citizens’ right to petition and should bar retaliation by private employers. | The right to petition constrains only government, not private actors. | It applies only to government, not private employers. |
| Can a retaliatory discharge claim be based on the right to petition? | Termination for petitioning lawmakers violates clear public policy, fitting the exception to employment-at-will. | No public policy exception exists for private employers based on this right. | No retaliatory discharge claim exists against a private employer for right to petition. |
| Is the textual difference between the TN Constitution and US Constitution meaningful? | State provision’s focus on citizen rights justifies broader protection. | History and precedent show such rights were always government constraints, not mandates on private parties. | Text does not mandate protection against private employers; history supports government action only. |
| Should McKee v. Hughes expand private cause of action for petitioning? | McKee suggests petitioners should be free from all penalties, including from employers. | McKee does not address employer-employee context or private enforceability. | McKee is not controlling for this situation; right of petition does not extend as Smith claims. |
Key Cases Cited
- Mason v. Seaton, 942 S.W.2d 470 (Tenn. 1997) (describes employment-at-will as fundamental in Tennessee law)
- Chism v. Mid–South Milling Co., 762 S.W.2d 552 (Tenn. 1988) (defines and limits the retaliatory discharge exception)
- Crews v. Buckman Lab’ys Int’l, Inc., 78 S.W.3d 852 (Tenn. 2002) (clarifies elements of common law retaliatory discharge)
- Stein v. Davidson Hotel Co., 945 S.W.2d 714 (Tenn. 1997) (addresses limits of constitutional rights in private employment)
- Williams v. City of Burns, 465 S.W.3d 96 (Tenn. 2015) (reiterates employment-at-will doctrine and its exceptions)