Heath v. United States
2011 WL 2899140
D.C.2011Background
- Patrick Carter was murdered in a parked car on Corcoran Street, NE, while his girlfriend Felicia Edwards was nearby; Edwards observed two men at a bus stop and later described one as tall with dreadlocks and dark skin, the other as lighter-skinned and bald.
- Eight months after the shooting, Courtnee Ervin, who had witnessed the event while high on crack cocaine, identified Heath as one of the shooters after being shown Heath's photo.
- Edwards later saw a tall, dark-skinned man with dreadlocks in a store, felt ill, and later identified Heath from a photo array after being shown nine photos; at trial she referred to the shooter as 'L' due to investigative briefing.
- Danielle Carter, the decedent’s sister, testified she believed Heath resembled the man she saw running from the car, based on height, build, gait, and a similar coat, though she did not definitively identify him.
- Heath sought to introduce Dr. Lori Van Wallendael, a cognitive psychology expert, to testify about eyewitness identification unreliability, stress, weapon focus, and unconscious transference; the government moved to exclude the testimony in limine.
- The trial court granted the in limine motion without a hearing; the jury convicted Heath on all counts after a five-day trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether excluding expert testimony violated the right to present a defense | Heath argues exclusion deprived him of a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. | United States contends cross-examination suffices and expert testimony is unnecessary. | Exclusion was erroneous for not applying Dyas/Benn II; however, it was harmless. |
| What test governs constitutional harm from erroneous defense-evidence exclusion | Materiality should be assessed to determine if exclusion created reasonable doubt that would not exist otherwise. | A simple Chapman/harmlessness analysis suffices under Kotteakos standards. | Adopts a reasonable-probability materiality standard: there must be a reasonable probability the omitted evidence would have led to a reasonable doubt. |
| Whether Dr. Van Wallendael's testimony would have changed the outcome | The proffered expert could undermine eyewitness identifications and the theory of unconscious transference. | The proffer would be only marginally relevant given witnesses' prior identifications and cross-examination. | No reasonable probability that exclusion affected the verdict; error non-constitutional and harmless. |
Key Cases Cited
- Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827 (D.C.1977) (three-part Dyas criteria for expert testimony admissibility)
- Benn v. United States (Benn II), 978 A.2d 1257 (D.C.2009) (rule that defense may present expert testimony on eyewitness unreliability with case-specific Dyas inquiry)
- Russell v. United States, 17 A.3d 581 (D.C.2011) (prejudicial error when exclusion of eyewitness identification expert testimony; requires Dyas hearing)
- Hager v. United States, 856 A.2d 1143 (D.C.2004) (limits of expert testimony on eyewitness reliability when identifying familiar persons)
- Agurs v. United States, 427 U.S. 97 (U.S.1976) (due process materiality standard for suppressed exculpatory evidence (Brady context))
- Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (U.S.1946) (harmlessness standard for evidentiary error (Kotteakos test))
- Bagley v. United States, 473 U.S. 667 (U.S.1985) (materiality standard for Brady-errors; reasonable probability of altered verdict)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (U.S.1995) (reframes materiality; reasonable probability of a different result)
- Clark v. United States, 639 A.2d 76 (D.C.1993) (limits of excluding defense evidence on central issues)