800 F.3d 955
8th Cir.2015Background
- In April 2013 Arkansas enacted the Public School Choice Act of 2013 (Act 1227), allowing students to transfer to nonresident districts but permitting a district to declare an annual exemption if it “is subject to the desegregation order or mandate of a federal court or agency.”
- Appellants (parents in Blytheville Sch. Dist. No. 5) applied in April 2013 to transfer their (all Caucasian) children to other districts; the Blytheville Board voted on April 29, 2013 to declare the district exempt and notified the ADE in May.
- Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act, alleging (a) procedural due process violations (statutorily created property interest in school-choice transfers and lack of pre-deprivation process) and (b) equal protection violations (race-motivated or irrational denial of transfers). They sought declaratory/injunctive relief and damages.
- The district court denied preliminary injunction and later granted summary judgment for the District; the parents appealed. While appeal was pending the Arkansas legislature repealed the exemption provision at issue and replaced it with different reporting requirements, mooting injunctive/declaratory relief but not damages claims.
- The Eighth Circuit affirmed: plaintiffs lacked a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest under the Fourteenth Amendment in transfers under the 2013 Act, and there was no equal-protection violation (no proof of discriminatory purpose and a rational basis for the District’s exemption decision).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mootness of injunctive/declaratory relief | Act repeal does not moot damage claims; prospective relief still warranted for past year | Legislature amended statute; repeal moots challenge to statute and injunction | Repeal moots declaratory/injunctive relief as to Act; damages claims survive and are considered |
| Procedural due process — liberty interest | Parents have fundamental liberty to direct children's education, including public-school choice | Right to choose within public system is not a recognized fundamental liberty extending to intradistrict placement under the Act | No protected liberty interest in choosing which public district within state; claim fails |
| Procedural due process — property interest | 2013 Act created a statutory, enforceable property interest in the ability to apply for and obtain interdistrict transfers; District deprived plaintiffs without required process | Act conferred only a discretionary possibility of transfer (not an entitlement); nonresident districts retained discretion; no deprivation of education occurred | No constitutionally cognizable property interest: Act provided only an expectancy, not an entitlement; due-process claim fails |
| Equal protection (race) | District acted with racially motivated purpose or irrationally by invoking an outdated desegregation mandate to nullify transfers | Action was facially neutral, affected all races equally, and the District had at least a rational basis (believed subject to federal/agency desegregation mandates and ADE guidance ambiguity) | No proof of discriminatory purpose; rational-basis review applies and District’s action survives it; equal-protection claim fails |
Key Cases Cited
- Teague v. Cooper, 720 F.3d 973 (8th Cir. 2013) (describing scope of Arkansas school-choice statute)
- Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (U.S. 1975) (students’ entitlement to public education triggers procedural protections)
- Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (U.S. 1977) (discriminatory intent required to apply strict scrutiny for facially neutral action)
- Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (U.S. 1925) (parents’ right to direct education does not give unqualified control over public-school placement)