Heartland Biogas, LLC v. Board of County Commissioners of Weld County, The, 1:16-cv-03183

Background

Heartland Biogas, LLC built and operated a renewable natural gas facility in Weld County, Colorado, using an anaerobic digester that produced gas injected into a pipeline and a digestate sold as Liquid Soil Amendment (LSA).
Weld County previously approved a Certificate of Designation (CD) and a Use by Special Review permit (USR‑1704); Heartland alleges reliance on county/CDPHE/CDA approvals and spent about $102 million developing the Facility.
In 2016 the County cited an odor violation; CDPHE staff later concluded Heartland lacked a valid transferred CD and that LSA distribution might be regulated as solid waste, prompting multiple hearings and inspections.
The Board indefinitely suspended USR‑1704 in December 2016; Heartland alleges the suspension and related enforcement destroyed the business and seeks damages for promissory estoppel, regulatory taking, due process, and equal protection violations.
The Board and several CDPHE individuals moved to dismiss; the magistrate judge recommended: dismiss Claim I (promissory estoppel); deny dismissal of Claim II (regulatory taking); dismiss Claims III–V (substantive, equal protection, procedural due process) against the Board; and grant dismissal of claims against the Individual Defendants on qualified immunity grounds.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether promissory estoppel claim is barred by the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA)	Heartland: Board promised validity of CD/permit and Heartland reasonably relied to its detriment	Board: Alleged assurances are misrepresentations of past fact (tort) and thus barred by CGIA	Dismissed: CGIA bars Claim I because allegations sound in tort/misrepresentation, not a future promise creating contractual estoppel
Ripeness and viability of regulatory‑takings claim	Heartland: Temporary suspension of USR‑1704 was a final action that destroyed economically beneficial use, so takings claim is ripe and plausible	Board: Suspension is temporary and not a final agency decision; no total deprivation of economically beneficial use	Denied dismissal: Court found suspension sufficiently final and the SAC plausibly alleges total economic loss so Claim II survives
Substantive due process (Board and Kreutzer)	Heartland: Board and Kreutzer’s actions were arbitrary, conscience‑shocking and destroyed Heartland’s property interest based on assurances	Defendants: No protected property interest or, alternatively, actions were not arbitrary; conduct does not shock the conscience	Dismissed: Court assumed a property interest arguendo but found alleged conduct insufficiently egregious to state a substantive due process claim
Equal protection (class‑of‑one)	Heartland: Board treated Heartland differently (unprecedented inspections/enforcement) because it was a biogas operator	Board: No specific comparators or facts showing similarly situated parties were treated differently; actions rationally related to public health/environment	Dismissed: Pleading lacked specific similarly situated comparators and alleged actions were rationally related to legitimate governmental interests
Procedural due process (Board and Kreutzer)	Heartland: Lack of adequate notice/process, surprise new allegations, and Kreutzer’s letter deprived Heartland of process	Defendants: Heartland had multiple hearings, opportunity to present evidence; Kreutzer’s letter was not a revocation and did not deprive Heartland of property	Dismissed: Court concluded Heartland received meaningful notice and hearings; no procedural‑due‑process violation shown
Claims against Individual Defendants and qualified immunity	Heartland: Individual CDPHE staff violated clearly established rights and changed longstanding positions regarding CD/LSA	Individuals: §1983 claims are untimely if treated as APA review; alternatively, qualified immunity bars suits because no clearly established constitutional violation	Dismissed: Court declined APA timeliness argument for §1983 but held Individual Defendants entitled to qualified immunity—no clearly established constitutional violation pled

Key Cases Cited

Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Summit Cty. v. DeLozier, 917 P.2d 714 (Colo. 1996) (promissory estoppel arises in contract‑like promises; distinguishes torty equitable estoppel)
Williamson Cty. Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (U.S. 1985) (ripeness test for regulatory takings: final decision and exhaustion of state compensation remedies)
Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (U.S. 1978) (factors for regulatory takings analysis)
Tahoe‑Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (U.S. 2002) (temporary moratoria and takings principles)
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (U.S. 1992) (categorical total‑loss takings rule)
Robinson v. Colo. State Lottery Div., 179 P.3d 998 (Colo. 2008) (characterizing claims as tort or non‑tort depends on nature of injury and relief sought)
Klen v. City of Loveland, 661 F.3d 498 (10th Cir. 2011) (substantive due process requires conscience‑shocking government conduct)